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ABSTRACT		
 
The 1996 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is the supreme law of the 
Republic and in enjoying this status it is prescribing the composition of the three 
different arms of government as well as each branch’s status within the new 
constitutional dispensation.1 Prior to this era of constitutional supremacy South 
Africa was subject to the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, an era where the 
courts could only challenge legislation on procedural grounds, but had no general 
power to declare legislation unconstitutional.  
The Constitution further provides for a separation2 of powers between these arms 
of government, and it has vested the judicial authority3 in the courts and conferred 
strong judicial review powers4 upon the Constitutional Court.  
 
The head of executive has recently argued that “the powers conferred on the 
courts cannot be regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a mandate 
given by the people in a popular vote”.5 The preceding quote is one of many 
statements and claims that forms part of a national debate on the nature and scope 
of the Constitutional Court’s powers in South Africa. The Constitutional Court 
has in recent years handed down judgments that were not favourable to the 
legislative6 and executive7 arms of the South African government. These 
                                                            
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.   
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 s.41(1)(f).  
3 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 s.165(1).  
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, 1996 s.172(1).  
5  http://mg.co.za/article/2012‐03‐02‐what‐the‐judicial‐review‐should‐be‐about  accessed on 
1202/03/07 02:47 PM.   
6 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
7 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Other 2011 ZACC 
23; Democratic Alliance  v  The Acting National Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (288/11)  [2012] 
ZASCA  15 (20 March 2012).  
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judgments are evident in the existing and on-going tension between, the three 
arms of government.   
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CHAPTER	ONE		
 
“The executive must be allowed to conduct its administration and 
policymaking work as freely as it possibly can. The powers conferred on 
the courts cannot be regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a 
mandate given by the people in a popular vote”8 
       JACOB ZUMA  
 
1.1. Introduction	and	problem	statement.						
 
The preceding quote is one of many statements and claims that forms part of a 
national debate on the nature and scope of the Constitutional Court’s powers in 
South Africa (SA). Currently, a national debate9 about the Court’s powers is on-
going, and the current dominant political party in government is arguing in favour 
of alternative forms of judicial review for SA.10    
 The Court has in recent years handed down judgments that were not favourable to 
the legislative11 and executive12 arms of the SA government. These judgments and 
the national debate are evident in the existing and on-going tension between, the 
three arms of government. In the midst of all these tensions it is all important to 
take cognisance of the fact that in a system of constitutional supremacy or 
parliamentary sovereignty only one mandatory has a final say, it is either 
parliament or the constitutional court, but it can never be both.   
                                                            
8 http://www.mg.co.za/article/2011‐11‐04‐courting‐disaster‐with‐the‐judiciary  (accessed on 09 
February 2012) 09:22AM.  
9 http://www.businesslive.co.za/southafrica/2012/03/05/we‐can‐change‐the‐
constitution:redebe  (accessed on 06 March 2012) 10:12 AM.     
10 http://mg.co.za/article/2012‐03‐02‐what‐the‐judicial‐review‐should‐be‐about (accessed on 07 
March 2012) 02:47 PM.   
11 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC). 
12 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Other  Case CCT 
53/11 2011 ZACC 23;   Democratic Alliance v The Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions 
(288/11) [2012] ZASCA  15 (20 March 2012).  
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Leading figures in the African National Congress (ANC) are now questioning the 
Constitutional Court’s powers to intervene in policy decisions and the standing 
that court’s afforded to political parties, who otherwise would not have been able 
to win the battle in the political arena, but successfully challenged executive and 
legislative decisions in court. The very young, 18 year old  Constitutional Court is 
currently under review, and it is further evidence of, not only tensions between 
branches of state, but that the independence and abilities of the current 
Constitutional Court is being questioned. In February 2011, the Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development, Mr Jeff Radebe, released a discussion document 
on the transformation of the judicial system and the role of the judiciary in the 
developmental South African for comments. The Department of Justice has 
invited interested research institutions to submit proposals for the assessment 
which will include, inter alia, a comprehensive analysis of the decisions of the 
Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal with a view to establishing 
the extent to which such decisions have contributed to the reform of South 
African jurisprudence and the South African law to advance the values embodied 
in the constitution.13     
 
1.2. The	different	forms	of	judicial	review.		
 
Tushnet distinguishes between weak and strong-form of review, and he describes 
weak-form of review as review which “combines some sort of power in courts to 
find legislation inconsistent with constitutional norms with some mechanism 
whereby the enacting legislature can respond to a court decision to that effect, and 
therefore weak-form systems vary with respect to both the nature of the judicial 
power, which can be merely declaratory or provisionally suspensive, and the form 
                                                            
13 Tlali Tlali Department of Justice and Constitutional Development ‘Proposals invited for the 
review of Con Court and SCA’ 26 March 2012 available at www.politicsweb.co.za  (accessed on 01 
August 2012).  
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of legislative response, which can be re-enactment or slight modification of the 
impugned legislation”.14  
Strong-form of judicial review according to Tushnet “places the power to 
determine the consistency of legislation with constitutional norms in a court 
authorized to deny legal effect to statutes it concludes are inconsistent with those 
norms”.15 The notwithstanding clause, section 33 of the Charter of Rights of the 
Canadian constitution, as Tushnet puts it, is a primary example of a weak-form of 
review mechanism”.16  
Tushnet is of the view that “a weak-form review may provide legislatures with 
information that they lack at the enactment stage and the advantage of allowing 
legislatures to respond better to the court’s decisions”. Tushnet describes weak-
form as review as to “create a dialogue between the courts and the legislatures”.17   
Not all the legal authors are in support of a weak or strong-form of judicial 
review, Waldron for example, states his case against judicial review conditionally 
based on four different assumptions: Waldron’s first assumption is that “the 
society has a broadly democratic political system with universal adult suffrage, 
and it has a representative legislature, to which elections are held on a fair and 
regular basis, and that these democratic institutions are in reasonably good order. 
They may not be perfect and there are probably on-going debates as to how they 
might be improved”.18 Waldron’s second assumption is that “the society we are 
considering has courts that are well-established and politically independent 
judiciary, again in reasonably working order”.19   
                                                            
14 Tushnet M.V ‘The Rise of Weak‐form Judicial Review’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 321‐333 323.   
15 Tushnet M.V ‘The Rise of Weak‐form Judicial Review’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 321‐333 325.  
16 Tushnet M.V ‘The Rise of Weak‐form Judicial Review’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 321‐333 329.  
17 Tushnet M.V ‘The Rise of Weak‐form Judicial Review’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 321‐333 330.  
18 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1361.  
19Waldron  J‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’  (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1363.   
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Thirdly, Waldron assumes, that “there is a strong commitment on the part of most 
members of the society to the idea of individual and minority rights20, and that 
this commitment is a living consensus and not just lip service and that the 
members of the society take rights seriously”.21  Finally, Waldron assumes that 
“there are substantial dissensus as to what rights are and what they amount to, and 
that the rights-disagreement are mostly not issues of interpretation in a narrow 
legalistic sense”.22   
Waldron’s argument is that “in cases which the assumptions fail, his argument 
against judicial review does not go through”.23  In the case of outcome-based 
reasons, Waldron suggests “that courts are good at deciding some issues and not 
others, but outcome-related reasons cut in both directions,24 and in the case of 
process-related reasons weigh unequivocally against judicial review and the 
preponderance of the process-related reasons weigh in favour of the legislature”.25 
Sinnott-Armstrong, however define “the difference between weak-form and 
strong-form judicial review as supposed to lie in where and when the dialogue 
ends”.26Sinnott-Armstrong is introducing a ‘third legal system’ that combines 
weak judicial review with strong judicial review, which he calls “a compound 
system”. In a system with only strong judicial review, Sinnott-Armstrong 
suggests, “legislatures never get to overturn judicial interpretations of 
constitutional provisions other than by means of a new constitutional 
amendment”.  
In a system of pure weak judicial review, according to Sinnott-Armstrong, 
“legislatures always get to overturn judicial interpretations of constitutional 
provisions simply by passing an in-your-face statute, but in a compound system, 
“legislatures sometimes can and sometimes cannot overturn judicial 
                                                            
20 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1364.  
21 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346 1365.  
22 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1367.  
23 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1402.  
24 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346  1376.  
25 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006)  115 Yale L.J. 1346  1386.  
26 Sinnott‐Armstrong W ‘Weak and Strong Judicial Review’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 381‐392 
386.    
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interpretations of constitutional provisions”. Sinnott-Armstrong suggests that “it is 
not enough for Tushnet to praise weak-form of review, since weak-form of review 
is also available in the compound system”.27 
   
1.3. The	concept	of	dialogue.		
 
The concept of dialogue, has elicited much debate and comments amongst leading 
constitutional law authors, academics and scholars. It is however, important to 
mention at this stage of this enquiry, that different viewpoints and stand points 
exists with regards to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the concept of dialogue, 
in particular an institutional dialogue as we will see later in this dissertation.    
Prominent constitutional law authors like Hogg and Bushell, for example, in their 
definition of the concept of a dialogue, is describing it as consisting “those cases 
in which a judicial decision striking down a law on Charter grounds is followed 
by some action by the competent legislative body”. In all these cases Hogg and 
Bushell suggests, that “there must have been consideration of the judicial decision 
by government, and a decision must have been made as to how to react to it. This 
may also have occurred in cases where a decision was not followed by any action 
by the competent legislative body”.28   
The Constitutional Court of South Africa has described a dialogue, different from 
what is offered by the Hogg and Bushell. In the case of S v Mhlungu,29 Sachs J 
described the concept of dialogue as follows: 
 “ I might add that I regard the question of interpretation to be one to which there 
can never be an absolute and definite answer and that, in particular, the search of 
where to locate ourselves on the literal/purposive continuum or how to balance 
out competing provisions, will always take the form of a principled judicial 
                                                            
27  Sinnott‐Armstrong W ‘Weak and Strong Judicial Review’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 381‐
392  384.  
28 Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No. 1  Osgoode Hall LJ 75  82.   
29 S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA867 (CC).  
 
 
 
 
 6 
 
dialogue, in the first place between members of this court, then between our court 
and other courts, the legal profession, law schools, parliament, and indirectly, 
with the public at large”.30   
 
Woolman, however, is of the opinion that “if a court refuses to say more than is 
necessary to decide a case on its facts, then one can hardly expect any 
meaningfully predictive principle to be drawn from the judgement (let alone a 
principled dialogue)”.31 The problem with minimalism, Woolman suggests, is 
that, “it fails to acknowledge that many minds can produce better knowledge, 
greater predictive certainty, and more politically legitimate outcomes, under 
appropriate conditions, and one way to produce better results on multi-member 
judicial panels is to ensure that such panels posses a healthy mix of judges”. 
Another solution according to Woolman, “is for courts to share the responsibility 
for constitutional interpretation with other state actors and non-state actors who 
are in a better position to provide both the information and the insight required to 
place the best possible gloss, empirically and normatively, on a constitutional 
right”.32   
 
1.4. The	aim	of	the	research.				
 
The aim of this research is in the main to determine, what, if any, the possibilities 
are for a weak-form of judicial review in SA by possibly incorporating a 
constitutional mechanism that can give rise to an institutional dialogue33 between 
the legislative and judicial arms of government. This research will be a 
comparative analysis of the SA predominantly strong-form34 of judicial review 
and judicial review under the Commonwealth weak-form of judicial review of 
                                                            
30 S v Mhlungu and Others 1995 (3) SA867 (CC) para129.  
31 Woolman S ‘The Amazing Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762 – 794  785.    
32 Woolman S ‘The Amazing Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762 – 794 792.  
33 Tushnet M.V ‘The Rise of Weak‐form Judicial Review’ in Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (eds) 
Comparative Constitutional Law (2011) 321‐333 332.  
34 s.172(1).   
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which Canada and England forms an integral part of.35 In doing so, there will be 
looked at the Charter of Rights of Canada36 (CCR) and in particular section 33 the 
notwithstanding clause that provides that parliament or the provincial legislature 
may expressly declare in an Act of parliament or of the legislature, that the Act or 
a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision on section 2, 
fundamental freedoms or legal rights in section 7 to 14, or equality rights in 
section 15 of the Charter.37 The discussion on Canada will also include section 1 
of the Charter which provide for the limitation of Charter rights as well as the 
remedies that section 24 afforded to Canadian court.   
 
The examination will also be on sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 199838 
(HRA) of England which provides that, so far as it is possible to do so, primary 
legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way 
which is compatible39 with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)40, 
and only if the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with the 
Convention rights it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.41   
If a court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right 
and that the primary legislation concerned prevents removal of that 
incompatibility it may make a declaration of that incompatibility.42 Further on the 
examination of the HRA will be a discussion on section 6 which prohibit a public 
authority to act incompatible with the Convention as well as section 10 which 
provide for a remedial action after a finding of Convention-incompatibility. 
Central to this examination shall be section 17243, section 38 and section 167 
which provides for strong review and section 39(2)44 of the 1996 Constitution of 
SA which provides that when interpreting any legislation or when developing the 
                                                            
35 Gardbaum S ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’ (2002) 49 Am J Comp L 
707 709.    
36Constitution Act 1982 PART 1 CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS.   
37 Constitution Act 1982 PART 1 CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS s.33(1).  
38 Human Rights Act 1998.  
39 Human Rights Act 1998 CHAPTER 42 Art.3(1).   
40 European Convention on Human Rights  
41 Human Rights Act 1998 CHAPTER 42 Art.4(2).  
42 Human Rights Act 1998 CHAPTER 42 Art.4(4).  
43 s.172.   
44 s.39(2).  
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Common law or customary law, every court tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights. Of importance to the discussion on 
South Africa, will be section 36 of the constitution which provides for the 
limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights, provided that the limitation is reasonable 
and justifiable.  
 
1.5. The	research	questions.		
	
The primary question that this research seeks an answer to is, whether it is 
possible to achieve a weak-form of judicial review through an institutional 
dialogue between the judicial and legislative arms of government in SA within the 
current constitution. If not, what do we need to do?  
Secondary, if constitutional amendments will have to be made, what impact will 
these constitutional amendments have on constitutional adjudication and 
interpretation in SA? Where and when will this dialogue end, and who will have 
the last say in constitutional interpretation, parliament or the Constitutional Court? 
What impact will it have on the principle of constitutional supremacy? In 
attempting to find answers to these research questions, this research will mainly 
focus on the relationship between the legislature and the courts, and in this regard 
the case studies will also focus on cases where the constitutional validity of 
impugned laws was at issue, although judicial review can take a variety of forms, 
depending on the context.45   
 
1.6. The	rationale	of	the	research.		
 
The rationale behind this research is to contribute meaningful to the national 
debate on the extent and scope of the Constitutional Court’s powers, role and 
functions.46 This research will also attempt to give insight and make 
                                                            
45 de Ville JR, Judicial Review of Administrative Action in South Africa Revised Edition (2003) 297.  
46 Jeff Radebe Minister of Justice Discussion document on the transformation of the judicial 
system and the role of the judiciary in the developmental South African State - February 2012. 
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recommendations on the topic of judicial review and whether a weak-form of 
judicial review should be seen as a possible solution to ongoing tension between 
the judicial legislative and executive arms of government. This research also seeks 
to contribute to certainty and clarity on the extent and scope of the powers, roles 
and functions of the judicial, legislative and executive arms of government and 
what the relationship between these arms of government should be.   
 
1.7. Layout	of	the	different	chapters.	
 
Chapter one is an introduction into the research and statement of the current 
problem in SA, its aim and rationale, as well as the research questions it seeks an 
answer to. Chapter two will be an in-depth discussion on judicial review from a 
Canadian perspective with the main focus on sections 33, the notwithstanding 
clause, section 1, the limitation clause as well as section 24 which empowers the 
courts with certain remedies. Crucial to the discussion around Canada will be 
certain landmark court decisions to determine the Canadian courts’ approach 
during judicial review. The different standpoints of leading constitutional law 
authors and academics will be discussed as far as judicial review in Canada is 
concerned. Different views on the current status of the notwithstanding clause will 
be looked at as well as whether section 33, section 1 or the remedies in section 24 
is capable of realising a dialogue between the legislative and judicial arms of the 
Canadian Government.  
 
 
In chapter three the focus will be on the HRA 1998, and in particular sections 3,4, 
6 and 10 of the Act. This discussion will also include court decisions as well as 
the views of leading legal authors and academics with regards to the effect and 
consequences of section 4 of the Act on the court’s declaratory powers under the 
HRA. Central to the discussion on the HRA, will be an assessment of the different 
approaches and standpoint on the scope and limits of an interpretation in terms of 
section 3 of the HRA. In discussing sections 3 and 4, it will also be looked at 
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whether there is in fact an institutional dialogue between the legislative and 
judicial branches in England and whether sections 3 or 4 is realising this dialogue.  
  
The fourth chapter will be a discussion on judicial review in post-apartheid SA, 
and the key sections under discussion will be sections 172, 167 and 38 of the SA 
constitution. There will also be looked at section 39(2) and section 36, and what, 
if any, it can offer in searching for the possibility of a weak-form of judicial 
review through an institutional dialogue in SA. There will be a discussion on the 
review power exercised by the courts and in this regard a few examples from case 
law will be looked at. Also key to the discussion on South Africa is the different 
opinions that exists in respect of which method of constitutional interpretation 
will best interpret the constitution of SA and whether it should be weak-form, 
strong-form or pragmatic exercise of judicial review.  
 
Chapter five will be a detailed comparison of judicial review in Canada, England 
and SA respectively. In this chapter it will also be attempted to propose answers 
to the primary as well as the secondary questions this research is seeking an 
answer to. The final part of chapter five will be devoted to discuss the way 
forward and to make recommendations for constitutional reform and possible 
amendments.  
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CHAPTER	TWO:	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	UNDER	THE	CANADIAN	
CHARTER	OF	RIGHTS.		
 
2.1.	Introduction.		
 
Canada, amongst other countries of its kind, have been categorized as a 
commonwealth country, and that countries such as Canada have created a new 
third model that stands between the polar models of constitutional and legislative 
supremacy.47 Judicial review of statutes in Canada is a longstanding part of the 
Canadian constitution, because it has been needed since 1867 to impose the rules 
of federalism on the two levels of government, but judicial review on Charter 
grounds dates only from 1982,48 and by virtue of section 33, a judicial decision to 
strike down a law for breach of section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of the Charter is not 
final”.49  
 
Prior to 1982, Canada’s federal and provincial legislatures collectively exercised 
the same parliamentary sovereignty enjoyed by the mother parliament at 
Westminster.50 Canada has only recently in 1982 adopted the Charter of Rights51 
(CCR) that has since influenced constitutional and statutory interpretation in 
Canada.  
 
 
                                                            
47Gardbaum S  ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’  (2002) 49 Am.J. Comp.  L. 
707 709.  
48Hogg P.W ‘The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation’ (1987) 25 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 87  99.   
49Hogg P.W  ‘Constitutional Law of Canada’  Student Edition (2004) 846.  
50 Gardbaum S  ‘The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism’  (2002) 49 Am.J. Comp. L. 
707 719.  
51 Constitution Act 1982 PART I CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS.  
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In this chapter, there will be a discussion on section 33 of the CCR which is 
viewed by Hogg as “an anomaly that is simply incompatible with constitutionally 
guaranteed rights”.52 
Crucial to the discussion will also be section 1 of the Charter which provide for 
the limitation of rights. There will also be looked at the types of remedies that the 
Charter confers upon Canadian courts and in this regard the focus will be on 
section 24. It is almost impossible to attempt to make a detailed analysis of 
judicial review in Canada without carefully and closely examining the approach 
of the courts during judicial review. I will also critically discuss the views and 
perspectives of leading constitutional law authors on the topic of judicial review 
and the concept of institutional dialogue in the Canadian context.  The central 
reason for the discussion on Canada is to unfold the Canadian model of judicial 
review and to ascertain whether there is institutional dialogue between courts and 
parliament in Canada and if section 33, section 1 or section 24 is the reason for it.   
 
The reasons why it is possible for a legislature to overcome judicial decision 
striking down a law for breach of the Charter, lies, according to Hogg and 
Bushell, in four features of the Canadian Charter of Rights that facilitate dialogue: 
First, “section 33 which is the power of legislation override; secondly, section 1, 
which allows for ‘reasonable limits’ on guaranteed Charter rights; thirdly, the 
‘qualified rights’, in section 7, 8, 9 and 12, which allow for action that satisfies 
standards of fairness and reasonableness; and fourthly, the guarantee of equality 
of rights under section 15(1), which can be satisfied through a variety of remedial 
remedies”. Each of these four features, according to Hogg and Bushell, “is usually 
offering the competent legislative body room to advance its objectives, while at 
the same time respecting the requirements of the Charter as articulated by the 
courts”.53    
 
                                                            
52 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 844.  
53 Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  82.   
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2.2.	The	Canadian	design	of	judicial	review.	
2.2.1.	The	limitation	analysis	in	section	1.	
 
Section 1 of the Charter provides as follows:  
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms 
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be 
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.54 
The CCR in section 1 provides that the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the 
Charter are not absolute55 and can be limited by laws as long as the limitation is 
reasonable and can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The 
consequences of applying the limitation analysis can have a two-fold effect; it can 
either cause the limitation in question to be declared unreasonable and unjustified 
or it could happen that the limitation be upheld and found to be reasonable and 
justified in an free and democratic society.    
The same as in most jurisdictions, the courts in Canada should be guided by a 
standard test to apply when determining what is reasonable in a case before it. 
According to Hogg, because of section 1, judicial review of legislation under the 
Charter of Rights “is a two-stage process. The first stage of judicial review is to 
determine whether the challenged law derogates from a Charter right. If it does 
not, then the review is at an end: the law must be upheld. If the law is held to 
derogate from a Charter right, then the review moves to the second stage. The 
second stage is to determine whether the law is justified under section 1 as a 
reasonable limit prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society”. 56During the first stage, according to Hogg, “the burden of 
proof is on the party alleging a breach of a Charter right, but during the second 
stage, the burden of proof shifts to the government seeking to support the 
challenged law”.57 The court in R v Oakes held that the standard of proof is a civil 
                                                            
54 Constitution Act 1982 PART I CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS s.1.     
55 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 790.  
56 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 718.  
57 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 795.  
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standard, namely, on a preponderance of probability.58 The Canadian Supreme 
Court in R v Oakes59 has developed the test for reasonableness and defined it as 
follows:   
“To establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society, two central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective must 
be of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected 
right or freedom. Second, once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, 
then the party invoking section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable 
and demonstrably justified. This involves a form of proportionality test. There are 
three important components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted 
must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be 
arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be 
rationally connected to the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally 
connected to the objective in the first sense, should impair as little as possible the 
right or freedom in question. Third, there must be a proportionality between the 
effects of the measures which are responsible for limiting the Charter right or 
freedom, and the objective which has been identified as of sufficient 
importance”.60   
This test in R v Oakes can be summarised as to require the limitation to have 
important objectives, and that by way of a proportionality test show that 
reasonable and justifiable means are chosen. Such proportionality tests requires 
the measures to be rationally connected to the objects, and it should impair as 
little as possible the rights or freedoms in question. Finally it requires 
proportionality between the effect of the measures and the sufficiently important 
objectives.  
It appears as if the Oakes analysis includes very strict tests and that much is 
expected before a limitation can be justified in terms of section 1 and also a lot 
must be proved for it to be declared unreasonable and unjustified.      
 
2.2.2.		The	notwithstanding	clause.		
 
Section 33 was the crucial element of the federal-provincial agreement of 
November 1981 that secured the consent of those provinces other than Quebec 
                                                            
58 R v Oakes [1986] 1. S.C.R. 103 para 67.  
59 R v Oakes [1986] 1. S.C.R. 103.  
60 R v Oakes [1986] 1. S.C.R. 103 paras 69 – 70.  
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that had until then been opposed to the Charter on the ground that it limited the 
sovereignty of their legislatures. Section 33 preserved that sovereignty, provided 
the legislature satisfied the requirements of the section.61  
The override clause of section 33 according to Hogg is to be inserted, to placate 
the provinces who feared the power of judicial review, enables judicial decisions 
under most of the provisions of the Charter to be overridden by the competent 
legislative body.62  
 
Section 3363 of the Charter of Rights provides inter alia: 
33(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act 
of parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision 
thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or section 
7 to 15 of this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made under 
this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have but for the 
provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration. 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five years 
after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified in the 
declaration. 
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration made 
under section (1). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection (4).  
Section 33, apart from the fact that it allows for overriding provisions in 
legislation and the consequences of such notwithstanding provisions, section 33 
does not automatically applies to all the provisions of the Canadian Charter, but 
only to sections 2, and 7 to 15 of the Charter.  
                                                            
61 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 838.  
62 Hogg P.W ‘The Charter of Rights and American Theories of Interpretation’ (1987)  25 Osgoode 
Hall L.J. 87  88 ‐ 89.   
63 Constitution Act 1982 PART I CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS s.33(1).  
 
 
 
 
 16 
 
The effect of the notwithstanding clause is that it preclude a court from declaring 
a piece of legislation or a particular section thereof unconstitutional if the 
legislation complies with the section 33 requirements for notwithstanding. 
A declaration under section 33, according to Hogg, will be held to be invalid by 
the courts if it fails to satisfy the various requirements of section 33, and the 
declaration must be confined to the rights specified in section 33, it must be 
specific as to the statute that is exempted from the Charter and as to the rights that 
are overridden and it may not be given retroactive effect.64 In the case of Ford v 
Quebec (Attorney General)65 it was held that a section 33 declaration is 
sufficiently expressed if it refers to the number of the section, subsection or 
paragraph of the Charter which contains the provision or provisions to be 
overridden. It seems that the Canadian parliament or any provincial legislature is 
required to be specific with regards to the Charter provisions the legislation 
intents to override, and that no Carte Blanche overriding may take place.  
It is also clear from the wording of section 33 that any notwithstanding provision 
only has a period of five years in which it can operate, meaning that there is no 
continuity of the notwithstanding provision after the expired period, unless it is re-
enacted by the Canadian parliament or a provincial legislature. This is further 
confirmation not only of the limited application of section 33, which only applies 
to section 2 and sections 7 to 15 of the Charter, but also a further restriction of a 
five year operating period, unless re-enacted. This five-year period, according to 
Hogg and Bushell, will always include an election, and will often yield a change 
of government.66  
 
 
 
                                                            
64 Hogg P.W Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition (2004) 844.  
65Ford v Quebec (Attorney General) [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.   
66 Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’  (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  84.  
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2.2.3.	The	remedies	under	section	24.			
 
The CCR is conferring locus standi upon anyone for the enforcement of rights and 
freedoms under the Charter and therefore section 24 provides as follows: 
(1)  Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have 
been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent 
jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate 
and just in the circumstances.  
(2) Where. In proceedings under subsection (1), a court concludes that 
evidence was obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights 
or freedoms guaranteed by this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded 
if it is established that, having regard to all the circumstances, the 
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of 
justice into disrepute.67 
  
 
According to Hogg, the remedies afforded to courts in terms of section 24, “is 
available only for a breach of the Charter and it is not a remedy for 
unconstitutional action in general, and it is not the exclusive remedy for breach of 
Charter rights”. Hogg is of the view that “subject to the important qualification 
that a remedy must be appropriate and just in all the circumstances of the case, 
there is no limit to the remedies that may be ordered under section 24(1), and they 
include defensive as well as affirmative remedies”.68  
According to Hogg, while the supremacy clause section 52(1) requires a court to 
hold that an unconstitutional statute is invalid, the courts do not always nullify 
statutes, but uses various techniques in statutory interpretation, including,  inter 
alia, temporary validity where the courts postpone the operation of the declaration 
                                                            
67 Constitution Act 1982 PART I Canadian Charter Of Rights And Freedoms s.24.  
68 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 877‐878.  
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of invalidity;69 severance, when only part of the statute is held to be valid, and the 
rest can independently survive and the court will hold that the bad part should be 
severed from the good part, thereby preserving the part that complies with the 
constitution;70 reading-in, where the court read words into the statute;71 reading 
down, when the statute will bear two interpretations, one of which would offend 
the Charter right and the other which would not and in that case the court will 
hold that the latter one is the correct one;72 constitutional exemption, where the 
court exempts a statute from complying with the constitution and;73 
reconstruction, this is where the court reconstruct unconstitutional legislation.74                
                                                
	2.3.	An	assessment	of	the	approach	of	the	courts.		
 
The Canadian parliament’s response towards unconstitutionally declared 
legislation can be categorised into three different categories, namely, (1) no 
response; (2) amend the legislation to be constitutionally compliant or repeal with 
constitutional compliant legislation and; (3) re-enactment of the legislation by 
inserting a section 33, notwithstanding clause.   
The case of Ford v Quebec75 is the only example where parliament has used 
section 33, the notwithstanding clause to overturn a judicial decision to nullify 
legislation that infringed upon Charter guaranteed rights and freedoms. The 
Supreme Court had struck down Quebec’s law banning the use of languages other 
than French in commercial signs.76 In the opinion of the court language is so 
intimately related to the form and content of expression that there cannot be true 
freedom of expression by means of language if one is prohibited from using the 
                                                            
69 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 852.  
70 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 857.  
71 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 859.  
72 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 864.  
73 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 864.  
74 Hogg P.W  Constitutional Law of Canada Student Edition  (2004) 866.  
75 Ford v Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712.  
76 Ford v Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 para 83.2.    
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language of one’s choice, and that language is not merely a means or medium of 
expression, but it colours the content and meaning of expression.77  
After the Ford v Quebec case, Quebec enacted a new law that continued to ban 
the use of any language but French in all outdoor signs and the province protected 
the new law with a section 33 notwithstanding clause.78 The Quebec case can be 
classified as a category no.3 case.  
 
A classical example of a category no.1 case is the case of R v Big M Drug Mart 
Ltd.79 Here, a company was charged with unlawful carrying on the sale of goods 
on a Sunday which was contrary to the Lord’s Day Act of 1970.80  The Supreme 
Court of Canada struck down the Lord’s Day Act, and the court held that the 
purpose of that Act was to compel the observance of the Christian Sabbath and 
this was a violation of the guarantee of freedom or religion under section 2(a) of 
the Charter.81 It has been argued by Hogg and Bushell that the court had the last 
word when it struck down the Lord’s Day Act, because the Act was never 
repealed, but was simply dropped from the next consolidation of federal statutes.82  
In the case of Hunter v Southam Inc.,83 the appellant challenged section 3 of the 
Combines Investigation Act that authorised entering and search and seizure 
despite a person’s security against unreasonable search and seizure afforded to 
everyone in terms of section 8 of the Charter.84 The court held that in the absence 
of a valid procedure for prior judicial authorization, searches conducted under the 
Act would be unreasonable.85 Parliament had immediately after the Hunter 
decision amended the Combines Investigation Act to meet the court’s 
                                                            
77 Ford v Quebec [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 para 40.  
78 Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  84.   
79 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.  
80 R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 para 1.  
81R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 para 136.   
82 Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75   94.  
83 Hunter et al. v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145.  
84 Hunter et al. v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 p148.   
85 Hunter et al. v Southam Inc. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 p161.  
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requirements,86 and the Act was later repealed and the new provision was 
introduced in the Competition Act of 1986.87 Parliament’s response to this 
judgment can be categorised as a category no.2 response.  
 
In the case of R v O’Connor88 the issue was whether and under what 
circumstances an accused is entitled to obtain production of sexual assault 
counselling records in the possession of third parties.89The accused wanted access 
to the records compiled during counselling sessions with the victims. The court 
held that the Crown’s well-established duty to disclose all information in its 
possession is not affected by the confidential nature of the therapeutic 
records.90The Canadian parliament responded with new legislation that subjects 
all records to a two-stage process that balances the accused’ s rights against the 
complainant’s privacy and equality rights and the social interest in encouraging 
the reporting of sexual assaults.91 Parliament’s response to the O’Connor decision 
can be classified as a category no.2 response.   
In the case of R v Daviault92 the issue was whether evidence of extreme self-
induced intoxication, tantamount to a state of automatism, constitute a defence to 
the offender of sexual assault. The court held that voluntary intoxication does not 
constitute a defence to an offence of general intent, but if a different approach to 
the approach followed by the court is considered desirable, parliament is free to 
intervene. Parliament responded with legislation providing that self-induced 
intoxication would no longer be a defence to a criminal offence involving an 
assault or any other interference or threat of interference by a person with the 
bodily integrity of another person by adding a new section 33 into the Criminal 
                                                            
86Hogg P.W  and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  89.  
87Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  89 in 
footnote no. 51.  
88 R v O’Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411.  
89 R v O’Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 para 1.  
90 R v O’Connor [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 para 7.  
91 Tushnet M.V ‘New Forms of Judicial Review and the persistence of Rights –and Democracy‐
Based Worries’ (2003)  Vol. 33 Wake Forest L. Rev. 813‐838  829.    
92 R v Daviault [1994] 3 S.C.R. 63.    
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Code.93 Parliament’s part in the dialogue on this issue according to Hogg and 
Bushell reads like a rebuttal of the majority’s position in R v Daviault, and it will 
be interesting to see how the courts will respond when the issue comes before the 
court for a second time.94This is another example of a category no.2 response 
from parliament.  
 
In the case of Thibaudeau v Canada95 the provisions in the Income Tax Act which 
allowed a non-custodial parent to deduct child support payments from his income, 
and which required a custodial parent to include child support payments in a 
income was challenged for infringing section 15(1) of the Charter.96 The Supreme 
Court held that there was no breach of the custodial parent’s right to equality 
under section 15(1) of the Charter.97In 1997, amendments to the Income Tax Act 
were enacted, under which child support payments are no longer deductible by a 
non-custodial parent, and are no longer taxable as income of the custodial 
parent.98 This is yet another classical example of a category no.2 response from 
parliament.   
In the case of Vriend v Alberta99the applicant was a laboratory coordinator at a 
college and was given a permanent, full-time position in 1998. In 1990, in 
response to an enquiry by the president of the college, Mr Vriend disclosed that he 
was homosexual. In 1991, the board of the governors of the college adopted a 
position statement on homosexuality and shortly thereafter the president of the 
college requested Mr Vriend to resign from employment but he refused. The 
college then terminated his employment because he gay and it was contrary to the 
                                                            
93 Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  103.  
94Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the 
Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  104.   
95 Thibaudeau v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627.   
96 Thibaudeau v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 p 628.   
97 Thibaudeau v Canada [1995] 2 S.C.R. 627 pp 699‐700. 
98 Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  105.   
99 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493. 
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college’s policy on homosexuality.100The court held that the exclusion of gay men 
and lesbians constitutes total, not minimal, impairment of the Charter guarantee of 
equality.101The exclusion of sexual orientation from the Individual Rights 
Protection Act does not meet the requirements of the Oakes test and cannot be 
saved under section 1 of the Charter.102 Parliament’s response to the Vriend 
decision is a classical example of a category no.1 response.  
In the case of Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop,103 the government appealed 
against the Ontario Court of Appeal’s finding of unconstitutionality of sections 
44(1.1) and 72(2) of the Canada Pension Plan. Under the Canada pension Plan, 
the spouse of a contributor was entitled to apply for a survivor’s pension after the 
death of the contributor, and if the survivor‘s pension was approved, it would be 
payable for each month following the death of the contributor. However, if the 
application of the survivor was not received by government within 12 months of 
the death of the contributor, the arrears that could be claimed by the survivor were 
limited to a 12-month period preceding the receipt of the application.104  
Until July 2000, for the purposes of entitlement to a survivor’s pension under the 
Act, the survivor had to have been married to the contributor or had to be of the 
opposite sex who was cohabitating with the contributor in a conjugal relationship 
at the time of the contributor’s death.105The Court held that sections 44(1.1) and 
72(2), although found within remedial legislation, restricts the availability of that 
legislation to marginalised groups.106   
The Court held that these provisions as applied to same-sex survivors are 
discriminatory and violates section 15(1) of the Charter and cannot be justified 
under section 1.107The Court concluded that, class members who were precluded 
by sections 44(1.1) or 72(2) from receiving the survivor’s benefits, and who 
                                                            
100 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 para 7.  
101 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 para 127.  
102 Vriend v Alberta [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 para 128.  
103 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429.  
104 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429 paras 1‐2.  
105 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429 para 4.  
106 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429 para 121.  
107 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429 para 123.  
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otherwise meet the eligibility requirements, will be entitled to payment of that 
benefit.108   
Recently in 2012, in the case of R v Tse,109 the constitutionality of section 184.4, 
the emergency wiretap provision of the Criminal Code was challenged. This 
provision permits a peace officer to intercept certain private communications 
without prior judicial authorisation, if the officer believes on reasonable grounds 
that the interceptions is immediately necessary to prevent an unlawful act that 
would cause serious harm, provided that judicial authority could not be obtained 
with reasonable diligence.110The Supreme Court held that the appropriate remedy 
is to declare section 184.4 unconstitutional and leave it to parliament to redraft a 
constitutionally compliant provision and in doing so, parliament may wish to 
address the additional concerns that the Court have expressed about the provision. 
The Court suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of 12 months to 
afford parliament the time needed to examine and redraft the provision.111  
By considering the Canadian parliament’s approach towards unconstitutionally 
declared legislation throughout the view examples from case law discussed above, 
it appears that parliament’s response can mostly be categorised as category no.2. 
Meaning that parliament had in the majority of instances either amended the 
legislation to be Charter rights compliant or repealed the legislation that were in 
breached of the Charter rights.  
  
2.4.	The	opinions	of	legal	authors.		
2.4.1.	Legal	scholars	in	support	of	the	dialogue	theory.			
 
Some constitutional law scholars however, have very distinct views and takes 
completely different standpoints as far as the dialogue theory is concerned. Hogg 
and Bushell are of the view that “judicial review is not ‘a veto over the politics of 
                                                            
108 Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop [2007]  S.C.R. 429 para 134.  
109 R v Tse [2012] S.C.C. 16  
110 R v Tse [2012] S.C.C. 16 paras 1‐2.   
111 R v Tse [2012] S.C.C. 16 para 102.    
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the nation’, but rather the beginning of a dialogue as to how best to reconcile the 
individualistic values of the Charter with the accomplishment of social and 
economic policies for the benefit of the community as a whole”.112By holding this 
view, Hogg and Bushell are suggesting that the courts should not be having the 
final voice in Charter rights interpretation but should rather enter into a dialogue 
with the other branches of government.  
Hogg and Bushell are of the view that in circumstances when the Canadian 
parliament use the section 33, notwithstanding provision, “it is likely that the 
public will realize that the legislature is, in fact, overriding a judicial interpretation 
of a particular Charter right or freedom, rather than the actual Charter right or 
freedom itself”.113The effect expressed notwithstanding clauses in Acts, is, 
according to Hogg and Bushell, is that it will “liberate” the statute from the 
provisions of section 2 and sections 7 to 15 of the Charter”.114  
The authors Hogg and Bushell pose the questions of: first, whether it is possible to 
have a dialogue between two institutions when one is so clearly subordinate to the 
other? Secondly, does dialogue not require a relationship between equals? Hogg 
and Bushell are answering these two questions by suggesting, that,  
“where a judicial decision is open to legislative reversal, modification or 
avoidance, then it is meaningful to regard the relationship between the 
court and the competent legislative body as a dialogue. In that case, the 
judicial decision causes a public debate in which Charter values play a 
more prominent role than they would if there had been no judicial 
decision. The legislative body is in a position to devise a response that is 
properly respectful of the Charter values that have been identified by the 
court, but which accomplishes the social or economic objectives that the 
judicial decision impeded”.115  
  
                                                            
112 Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  105.   
113 Hogg P.W, Bushell A and Wright W.K “Charter Dialogue Revisited _ OR “Much Ado About 
Metaphors” (2007) 45 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 1 35.   
114 Hogg P.W and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)” (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  83.  
115 Hogg P.W  and Bushell A “The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)”  (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75   79‐80.   
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Tremblay is more pro-dialogue theory and hold that, “ section 33 is not the only 
provision that can give rise to an institutional dialogue in the interpretation of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights, but both section 33 and section 1 through its 
application, can give rise to an institutional dialogue”.116 According to Tremblay 
“a great value of judicial review and this dialogue among the branches is that each 
of the branches is made somewhat accountable to the other. The work of the 
legislature is reviewed by the courts and the work of the court in its decisions can 
be reacted to by the legislature in the passing of new legislation (or even 
overarching laws under section 33 of the Charter). This dialogue between and 
accountability of each of the branches have the effect of enhancing the democratic 
process, not denying it”.117  
  
2.4.2.	Legal	scholars	more	doubtful	about	the	dialogue	theory.		
 
Macfarlane,118for example, believe that some of the remedies developed by the 
Canadian courts are “conducive to dialogue” while others are viewed as 
“preventing dialogue”, these remedies includes the “suspended declaration 
remedy, reading in, reading down and severance”. The suspended declaration 
remedy, Macfarlane hold, “is most often used where invalidating the law would 
leave a troubling policy vacuum and the court knows some type of legislative 
response is necessary”. Reading in, reading down and severance, according to 
Macfarlane, “almost never result in dialogic responses from the legislature, 
                                                            
116 Tremblay L.B  ‘The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and 
legislatures’ (2005) I Con 3 No.4 617 – 648  618.  
117 Tremblay L.B  ‘The legitimacy of judicial review: The limits of dialogue between courts and 
legislatures’ (2005) I Con 3 No.4 617 – 648  626.    
118 Macfarlane E ‘Dialogue or compliance? Measuring legislatures’ policy responses to court 
rulings on rights” (2012) 0(0) International Political Science Review 1‐18  11‐14 available at 
http://www.ips.sagepub.com (accessed on 06 August 2012).    
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because the court is doing the work of the legislature and therefore the legislature 
almost always treat the matter as being settled”.119      
Macfarlane is holding that, “Canada is widely considered the model for dialogue 
review in other parliamentary systems, but suggests that these jurisdictions should 
approach dialogue theory with an abundance of caution”. Of the weak-form 
systems of review, Macfarlane suggests, “Canada’s is theoretically closer to the 
strong-form model than the others and in contrast to Canada, a more meaningful 
dialogic exchange might take place in a system like the United Kingdom”.120  
 
2.4.3.	Critiques	of	the	dialogue	theory.		
 
Critiques of Hogg and Bushell’s concept of dialogue finds it to be problematic in 
several respects. Manfredi and Kelly, for example, are of the view that, “first, the 
empirical demonstration on which dialogue depends suffers from several flaws. 
Secondly, even without these flaws, the metaphor as constructed in the Hogg and 
Bushell’ study provides only a weak responds to the normative issues implicit in 
the democratic critique of Charter-based judicial review”.121  
Sinnott-Armstrong disagrees with the concept of dialogue, by holding that “there 
is no true dialogue when a court finds that legislation violates the constitution, and 
the legislature responds, though, we are going to pass it again anyway. The 
legislature is such a case, is not responding to the court’s reasons, Sinnott-
Armstrong suggests”.122     
                                                            
119 Macfarlane E ‘Dialogue or compliance? Measuring legislatures’ policy responses to court 
rulings on rights” (2012) 0(0) International Political Science Review 1‐18  11‐14 available at 
http://www.ips.sagepub.com (accessed on 06 August 2012).   
120 Macfarlane E  ‘Dialogue or compliance? Measuring legislatures’ policy responses to court 
rulings on rights” (2012) 0(0) International Political Science Review 1‐18  14  available at 
HTTP://www.ips.sagepub.com  (accessed on 06 August 2012).         
121 Manfredi C.P and Kelly J.B ‘Six Degrees of Dialogue: A Responds to Hogg and Bushell’ (1999) 37 
No.3 Osgoode Hall L J 513  515.   
122 Sinnott‐Armstrong W ‘Weak and Strong Judicial Review’ (2003) 22 Law and Philosophy 381‐
392  385.    
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Petter, is of the view that “dialogue theory is seriously deficient and the theory 
mitigates more than it legitimates, and by acknowledging the subjective nature of 
Charter decision-making, dialogue theory undercuts the legitimacy of judicial 
review as it seeks to explain why legislatures should be allowed to trump judicial 
decisions”. Another deficiency of the dialogue theory, according to Petter, is “its 
tendency to discount the extent to which judicial decision-making under the 
Charter drives public policy-making in Canada”.123 
Mc Donald is of the opinion that, “if Hogg and Bushell think or imply they have 
refuted all democratically inspired objections to judicial review, they significantly 
overstate their case, because many democratic objections to judicial review is not 
merely about who gets the final say”. Mc Donald hold that, “despite the academic 
fixation on the counter-majoritarian difficulty, not all democratic objections to 
judicial review focus on the courts’ comparative lack of democratic 
accountability”. Mc Donald further argues that “in particular, some democratic 
objectors express concerns over the impact of judicial review on the overall health 
and wellbeing of a democracy”.124   
 
In responds to the critiques on Hogg and Bushell’s concept of and interpretation 
of dialogue, they hold that, “with dialogue they did not mean that the courts and 
legislatures were literally talking to each other, but that the court decisions in 
Charter cases usually left room for a legislative response, and usually received a 
legislative response”.125   
 
 
                                                            
123 Petter A ‘Twenty years of Charter justification: From liberal legalism to dubious dialogue’ 
(2003) 52 UNBLJ 187  195‐196.  
124 Mc Donald L ‘Rights, ‘dialogue’ and democratic objections to judicial review’ (2004) 32 Fed. L. 
Rev. 1 24.  
125 Hogg P.W, Bushell A and Wright W.K ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited _ OR “Much Ado About 
Metaphors’ (2007) 45 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 1  4.   
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2.5.	Conclusion.		
 
An assessment of the case law discussed in chapter two as well as the appreciated 
analysis and views of leading constitutional law authors in respect of section 33 of 
the Charter, it appears as if section 33 is not currently contributing towards an 
institutional dialogue in Canada.  
In their 1997 article, Hogg and Bushell are claiming, that, their study of 66 cases 
in which laws was held to be invalid for breach of the Charter, that all but 13 
elicited some response from the competent legislative body. In seven cases, the 
response was simply to repeal the offending law. In the remaining 46 cases, a new 
law was substituted for the old law. In two, the decisions were overruled and the 
new law essentially re-enacted the law that had been held to be invalid, once 
through the use of section 33 and once through the use of section 1.126   
Since their 1997 article, Hogg and Bushell claim, there have been 23 cases in 
which a law was held to be invalid for breach of the Charter, and of those 23 
cases, 14 or approximately 61 per cent elicited some response from the competent 
legislative body. In one case, the response was simply to repeal the offending law, 
and in the remaining 13 cases, a new law was substituted for the offending law. In 
no case did the legislative sequel amount to the decision being overruled using 
either section 33 or section 1.127    
The fact that the notwithstanding clause has not been enforced in such a long 
period, might be one of the reasons why the notwithstanding clause has lost its 
dominance in Charter rights litigation. Therefore, another possibility is that it 
might be that the institutional dialogue do exists between the Canadian courts and 
the parliament, but it appears as if this dialogue is not been realised as a result of 
                                                            
126 Hogg P.W, Bushell A and Wright W.K ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited _ OR “Much Ado About 
Metaphors’ (2007) 45 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 1 51;  See also Hogg P.W  and Bushell A ‘The Charter 
Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad 
Thing After All)’ 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J  75 97 – 100.  
127 Hogg P.W, Bushell A and Wright W.K ‘Charter Dialogue Revisited _ OR “Much Ado About 
Metaphors’ (2007) 45 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 1  51‐52.   
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section 33, but rather the remedies under section 24, subject to prior application of 
the limitation analysis in section 1.  
It appears that in the midst of all the possible remedies that are available to the 
courts when the rights in sections 2, and 7 to 15 has been infringed, the 
notwithstanding clause in section 33 have the potential of barring the courts from 
exercising those remedies but to adhere to the notwithstanding provisions in 
statutes, although section 33 has only been invoked only once during its existence 
in the Charter.  
It appears as if section 33, although still exists as a notwithstanding clause in the 
CCR it, to a certain extent does not have that ‘veto effect’ on Charter rights 
anymore. It has been argued by Hogg and Bushell that section 33, in practice has 
become relatively unimportant, because of the development of a political climate 
of resistance to its use.128 
                                                            
128 Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ 35 No.1  Osgoode Hall L J 75 83.    
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CHAPTER	THREE:	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	UNDER	THE	HUMAN	
RIGHTS	ACT	1998.		
3.1.	Introduction.	
 
It is important to note at this stage that England do not have a Bill of Rights, 
although attempts to adopt a Bill of Rights is currently in progress.129Prior to the 
Human Rights Act (HRA),130 English law failed to develop effective protection 
for human rights against incursions by public officials and authorities, and much 
of the blame for the parlous defence of civil liberties and human rights can be 
attributed to the judges’ sentimental attachment to the Wednesbury test established 
in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation131 
as the appropriate standard for reviewing official action. Under the Wednesbury 
test, action was only reviewable if it was so unreasonable that no reasonable 
decision-maker would have taken it.132 
Parliamentary sovereignty, according to Herling and Lyon, have two elements: 
that parliament may make or unmake any law and that a parliamentary statute is 
the highest law known in the United Kingdom and may not be set aside except by 
parliament itself.133  
The pre-HRA approach is also described by Francesca Klug as a “legislature first” 
approach in which the courts are explicitly barred from scrutinising clearly 
expressed Acts of parliament.134 
                                                            
129 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p.6 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf   (accessed on 08 November 2012).   
130 Human Rights Act 1998.   
131 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.  
132 Leigh I ‘The standard of judicial review after the Human Rights Act’ in Fenwick H, Phillipson G 
and Masterman R Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (2007) 174.  
133 Herling D and Lyon A Briefcase on Constitutional and Administrative Law 4 ed (2004) 37.   
134 Klug F ‘Judicial Deference Under The Human Rights Act 1998’  (2003) Issue 2 E.H.R.L.R. 125‐133  
127‐128.  
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The HRA came into force in October 2000, and its purpose is to give greater 
effect in domestic law to the human rights set out in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).135 The ECHR was adopted in 1950, ratified by the United 
Kingdom in 1951 and entered into force in 1953. The unusual feature of the 
Convention, it is said, is that it provides a mechanism for individuals to enforce 
their Convention rights against state parties.136The Convention is now 
administered by two bodies, namely, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe (CMCE) and the European Court of Human Rights (Court of Human 
Rights) in Strasbourg. At an international level, any individual, non-governmental 
organisation or group of individuals can petition the Court of Human Rights 
alleging a violation of Convention rights.137The Court of Human Rights was 
established in January 1959 in terms of Article 19 of the Convention which 
awarded it a status of permanency138 and its jurisdiction has been recognised by 
47 European states.  
Crucial to this enquiry and discussion on England, is the Court of Human Rights, 
wherefore the HRA imposes an obligation on the interpreters of the HRA to 
follow an interpretation that is compatible with and give effect to the Convention 
rights.139The HRA also puts an obligation on a court or tribunal, that, when 
determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right, to 
take into account, judgments, decisions, declarations and advisory opinions of the 
Court of Human Rights.140 Section 6 of the HRA also imposes further obligation 
upon public authorities, including the courts,141 not to act incompatible with the 
ECHR wherefore such incompatibility would be unlawful.142 
 
                                                            
135 European Convention on Human Rights  
136 Starmer K, Strange M and Whitaker Q with Anthony Jennings QC and Tim Owen QC Criminal 
Justice, Police Powers & Human Rights (2002) 1.  
137 Starmer K, Strange M and Whitaker Q with Anthony Jennings QC and Tim Owen QC Criminal 
Justice, Police Powers & Human Rights (2002) 1.  
138 European Convention on Human Rights Article 19.  
139 Human Rights Act 1998 s.3(1).   
140 Human Rights Act 1998 s.2(1)(a).  
141 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6(3)(a).  
142 Human Rights Act 1998 s.(6)(1).  
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This chapter is devoted entirely to the discussion on the HRA of England, and of 
crucial importance to the discussion are sections 3, 4, 6 and 10 of the Act. These 
provisions, however, lies central to statutory interpretation in England, and 
therefore directs constitutional interpretation in England.  
After the introduction, this chapter starts off with a description of the HRA model 
of judicial review, by inter alia, a discussion on section 3, the interpretation 
clause; section 4, which permit courts to make a declaration of Convention-
incompatibility; section 6 which makes it unlawful for a public authority to act 
incompatible with the Convention; section 10 which is providing a process for 
remedial action, should parliament decide to amend or repeal Convention-
incompatible laws.  
The discussion in this chapter will also include the inescapable voice of the 
United Kingdom’s Superior Courts, in cases where the Convention-compatibility 
of impugned laws was mainly at issue. The case law will include judgments from 
as early as the late 1990s and until as recent as the years 2010s.   
In the case of Jackson v Attorney General143 it was held that the United Kingdom 
do not have an uncontrolled constitution and the European Convention on Human 
Rights as incorporated into law by the Human Rights Act 1998 created a new 
legal order. The doctrine of parliamentary supremacy can now be seen to be out of 
place in the modern United Kingdom.144 
In the opinion of Lord Elias, before the coming into operation of the Human 
Rights Act, the courts played a traditionally subservient role, but the Human 
Rights Act has transformed the relationship between courts and parliament, 
conferring far greater powers upon the courts than they have hitherto been entitled 
to exercise.145  
                                                            
143 Jackson and others v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56.  
144 Jackson and others v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56 para 102.  
145 Rt Hon Lord Justice Elias ANNUAL LORD RENTON LECTURE 24 November 2009 at the Institute 
for Advanced Legal Studies, London STATUTE LAW SOCIETY p 6.  
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The purpose of the HRA is inter alia, to give further effect to rights and freedoms 
guaranteed under the ECHR.146 It is however important to note that the  purpose 
of the HRA and the scope of the application of sections 3 and 4 of the Act can 
only be fully understand through the readings, commentaries and appreciated 
views, though very distinct from each other, of leading constitutional law authors, 
academics and scholars. The opinions of legal authors and academics should be 
viewed with a full understanding of how legislation is being interpreted in courts 
and therefore the voices of judges in the UK courts are of utmost importance to 
this research.          
According to Francesca Klug, the purpose of the HRA is to “allow the courts to 
apply human rights principles where they were once barred from doing so. It was 
not enacted so that the courts could have the final say in areas where there is no 
settled human rights answer any more than it allows them to abdicate from their 
responsibility to scrutinise on the grounds that is outside their sphere of 
competence”.147  
According to Mark Elliott, “the Human Rights Act is essentially an interpretive 
instrument,148 and it is clear that the carefully and subtly drafted Act preserves the 
principle of parliamentary sovereignty”.149  
 
3.2.	Review	powers	under	the	HRA.		
3.2.1.	Convention‐compatible	interpretation.	
 
Section 3150 as the guiding section in respect of statutory interpretation under the 
HRA is very prescriptive as to how primary as well as subordinate legislation 
should be interpreted, and in doing so it provides as follows: 
                                                            
146 Human Rights Act of 1998 Preamble.  
147 Klug F ‘Judicial Deference Under The Human Rights Act 1998’  (2003) Issue 2 E.H.R.L.R. 125‐133  
132.  
148 Elliott M The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (2001) 200.  
149 Elliott M  The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (2001) 201.  
150 Human Rights Act of 1998 s.3.   
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(1). In so far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate 
legislation must be read and give effect in a way which is compatible 
with the Convention rights. 
(2). This section -       
(a) applies to primary legislation and subordinate legislation 
whenever enacted; 
(b) does not effect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible primary legislation, and 
(c) does not effect the validity, continuing operation or 
enforcement of any incompatible subordinate legislation if ( 
disregarding any possibility of revocation ) if primary legislation 
prevents removal of the incompatibility.      
The literal reading of section 3 tells us that the interpreter of legislation must first 
find an interpretation which is compatible with the Convention rights, but subject 
to possibility.  
It has been argued by Palmer that section 3(1), is a powerful tool whose use is 
obligatory, and it is not an optional canon of construction, nor is its use dependent 
on the existence of ambiguity.151A closer look at Palmer’s opinion on section 3(1) 
is that this author is of the view that the instructions flowing from the wording of 
this subsection means that its directions is peremptory and inescapable and 
therefore courts must follow it.   
In the case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,152 the court held that section 3 is a key 
section of the Human Rights Act, and that one of the primary means by which 
Convention rights are brought into this country. Parliament has agreed that all 
legislation existing and future should be interpreted in a particular way.153 
                                                            
151 Palmer E Judicial Review, Socio‐Economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (2007)  119.    
152 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30.  
153 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 para 26.  
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Judicial review in terms of section 3 is makes it possible for legislation to be 
Convention-compatible through re-interpretation by the courts and not by way of 
re-enactment through the legislature.  
 
3.2.2.	Declaration	of	incompatibility.		
 
Section 4 of the HRA provides that: 
(1) Subsection (2) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a 
provision of primary legislation is compatible with a Convention right. 
(2) If the court is satisfied that the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, 
it may make a declaration of that incompatibility. 
(3) Subsection (4) applies in any proceedings in which a court determines whether a 
provision of subordinate legislation, made in exercise of a power conferred by the 
primary legislation, is compatible with a Convention right. 
(4) If the court is satisfied –  
(a) That the provision is incompatible with a Convention right, and  
(b) That (disregarding any possibility of revocation) the primary legislation 
concerned prevents removal of the incompatibility, it may make a declaration 
of that incompatibility. 
Subsection 6 declares that a declaration in terms of section 4 does not affect the 
validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the provision in respect of which 
it is given, and is not binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is 
made.154 
Section 4 of the HRA, however, is conferring on the courts the power to declare 
Convention-incompatible any legislation, whether primary or subordinate, that 
cannot be read in line with the Convention. Considering the reading strategies that 
is available to courts during a section 3 interpretation, which includes the 
                                                            
154 Human Rights Act 1998 s.4(1) – (4) and (6).  
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remedies of reading in as well as reading down, it appears that the courts would 
have to do much before opting for a section 4 declaration of Convention-
incompatibility. The section 4 declaration is also seen by most authors as a 
measure of last resort and courts should first try to find an interpretation that can 
make the impugned laws Convention-compatible.  
In a situation where it is impossible for the courts to find a Convention-
compatible reading of a statute, and it does make a Convention-incompatible 
declaration, it would not affect the validity, continuing operation or enforcement 
of the provisions and it is neither binding upon the parties before the court. 
Looking deeper and more closely to the wording of subsection 6, it appears as if 
parliament or any organ of state cannot be compelled to give effect to the orders 
of the courts in respect of Convention-incompatible laws. It further appears as if 
section 4, although conferring courts the power to make a declaration of 
Convention-incompatibility, is indirectly confirming parliament’s status of 
sovereignty and dominance over enacted legislation, whether it is Convention-
compliant or not.   
 
3.2.3.	Section	6.		
 
(1) It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible 
with a Convention right. 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if –  
(a) As the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the 
authority could not have acted differently; or  
(b) In the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary 
legislation which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is 
compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was acting so as 
to give effect to or enforce those provisions.  
(3) In this section “public authority” includes –  
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(a) a court or tribunal, and  
(b) any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public 
nature, but does not include either House of Parliament or a 
person exercising functions in connection with proceedings in 
Parliament.  
(4) F11--------------------  
(5) In relation to a particular act, a person is not a public authority by virtue 
only of subsection (3)(b) if the nature of the act is private.  
(6) “An act” includes a failure to act but does not include a failure to –  
(a) introduce in, or lay before, Parliament a proposal for 
legislation; or  
(b) make any primary legislation or remedial order.155  
 
Section 6, although its provisions forbid a public authority to act incompatible 
with the Convention, the section has limited application, inter alia, that a public 
authority does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising 
functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament. Section 6 is further only 
limited to actions of a public nature and exclude any act of a private nature. 
Section 6 is also not binding upon parliament for any failure to introduce or to 
table any proposal or legislation in parliament, as well as any remedial order.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
155 Human Rights Act 1998 s.6.  
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3.2.4.	Remedial	action.		
 
Section 10, in granting power to take remedial action it provides as follows:  
(1) This section applies if –  
(a) a provision of legislation has been declared under section 4 to be 
incompatible with a Convention right and, if an appeal lies –  
(i) all persons who may appeal have stated in writing that they do not 
intent to do so; 
(ii) the time for bringing an appeal has expired and no appeal has been 
brought within that time; or 
(iii)an appeal brought within that time has been determined or 
abandoned; or  
(b) it appears to a Minister of the Crown or Her Majesty in Council that, 
having regard to a finding of the European Court of Human Rights 
made after the coming into force of this section in proceedings against 
the United Kingdom arising from the Convention.  
(2) If a Minister of the Crown considers that there are compelling reasons for 
proceeding under this section, he may by order make such amendments to 
the legislation as he considers necessary to remove the incompatibility.  
(3) If, in the case of subordinate legislation, a Minister of the Crown 
considers-  
(a) that it is necessary to amend the primary legislation under which the 
subordinate legislation in question was made, in order to enable the 
incompatibility to be removed, and 
(b) that there are compelling reasons for proceeding under this section, he 
may by order make such amendments to the primary legislation as he 
considers necessary. 
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(4) This section also applies where the provision in question is in subordinate 
legislation and has been quashed, or declared invalid, by reason of 
incompatibility with a Convention right and the Minister proposes to 
proceed under paragraph 2(b) of Schedule 2.  
(5) If the legislation is an Order in Council, the power conferred by subsection 
(2) or (3) is exercisable by Her Majesty in Council.  
(6) In this section “legislation” does not include a Measure of the Church 
Assembly or of the General Synod of the Church of England.  
(7) Schedule 2 makes further provision about remedial orders.156 
 
Section 10 of the HRA provides for the taking of remedial action, but section 10 
should not be read in isolation, but should be read in conjunction with section 4. 
Any remedial action taken in terms of section 10 is subject to a declaration of 
Convention-incompatibility under section 4, and where such declaration is still 
subject to an appeal. Therefore section 10 do not provide for automatic remedial 
action taken by the relevant Minister, but all the pre-requisites in both section 4 
and section 10 must be fulfilled in order for a section 10 remedial action to take 
place.  
 
 
3.3.	An	assessment	of	the	court’s	interpretation	and	parliamentary	
response.			
3.3.1.	Examples	of	Convention‐compatibility	interpretations	in	
terms	of	section	3.	
 
The following two cases are clear examples of the changes that the HRA has 
brought to statutory interpretation in the United Kingdom. One year before the 
                                                            
156Human Rights Act 1998 s.10.   
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HRA came into force, in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Associates Ltd,157 the 
House of Lords held that whilst a same-sex-couple could constitute a family for 
the purposes of the Rent Acts, the definition of spouse to include a person living 
with the original tenant as his or her husband or wife pointed to a gendered 
heterosexual relationship between one man and one woman and could therefore 
not be read into the legislation in order to make it European Convention of Human 
Rights compatible. The majority court refused to interpret the Rent Act in favour a 
surviving partner to a homosexual co-habitation, despite the court’s obligation to 
adhere to the prohibition of discrimination in Article 14 of the Convention.158       
In the case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza,159four years after the HRA came into 
force, the House of Lords was faced with materially analogous facts as in the case 
of Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Associates Ltd. The original tenant died, but he 
was involved in a stable and monogamous homosexual relationship with Godin-
Mendoza until his death. After the death of the deceased, Mr Godin-Mendoza was 
still living in the flat and Mr Ghaidan, the landlord brought and action in court for 
the possession of the flat.160 The court held that interpretation under section 3 is 
the prime remedial remedy, and that resort to section 4 must be an exceptional 
course, and that there is a strong rebuttable presumption in favour of an 
interpretation consistent with Convention rights.161 Lord Steyn agreed with the 
Court of Appeal that, ‘as his or her wife or husband’ in the statute means ‘as if 
they were his wife or husband’.162 
 
The case of R v A,163is a clear example of how the court exercised a very strong 
review through a section 3 interpretation.  Section 41 of the Youth and Criminal 
Evidence Act that prevented an accused from calling evidence about the 
complainant’s prior sexual history in respect of the issue of whether she had 
                                                            
157 Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Ltd [1999] 4 ALL ER 705.   
158 European Convention on Human Rights Art.14.  
159 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30.  
160 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 para 2.  
161 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 para 50.  
162 Ghaidan v Godin‐Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 para 51.  
163 R v A [2001] UKHL 25.   
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consented to his conduct was challenged. The House of Lords held that section 41 
should be read in favour of the accused, and that due regard always being paid to 
the importance of seeking to protect the complainant’s dignity from humiliating 
questions, the test of admissibility is whether the evidence is nevertheless so 
relevant to the issue of consent, that to exclude it would endanger the fairness of 
the trial under section 6 of the Convention.164   
In R v A, lord Steyn refers to section 3 as an emphatic adjuration by the 
legislature, and held that the obligation under section 3 is a strong one, and it 
applies even if there is no ambiguity in the language in the sense of the language 
being capable of two different meanings. Lord Steyn further held it to be in the 
will of parliament as reflected in section 3 that it will sometimes be necessary to 
adopt an interpretation which linguistically may appear strained. Lord Steyn was 
of the view that, the techniques to be used not only involve the reading down of 
express language, but also the implication of provisions. A declaration of 
incompatibility is a measure of last resort, and it must be avoided, unless it is 
plainly impossible to do so.165   
 
3.3.2.	Examples	of	cases	where	a	Convention‐compatible	
interpretation	was	impossible.		
 
These case where a declaration of Convention-incompatibility was simply 
unavoidable for the courts, can further be categorised into three different 
categories, inter alia, no.1, where the legislation have been remedied by later 
primary legislation; no.2, where the legislation have been remedied by a remedial 
order under section 10; no.3, where the related provisions had already been 
remedied by primary legislation at the time of the declaration.  
 
 
                                                            
164 R v A [2001] UKHL 25 para 46. 
165 R v A [2001] UKHL 25 para 44.  
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3.3.2.1.	Where	the	legislation	have	been	remedied	by	later	
primary	legislation.	
 
In McR’s Application for Judicial Review,166 the applicant was charged with a 
number of sexual offences against a mentally retarded woman. All the offence 
with which the applicant was charged with, were all charges of attempted buggery 
contrary to section 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861. The applicant 
argued that section 62 was in breach of Article 8 of the Convention. The applicant 
sought a declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the HRA and an order 
of certiorari quashing the decision of Magistrate Court to remand the applicant on 
the charges of attempted buggery. The court held that, the continued existence in 
the law of Northern Ireland of section 62 of the Offences against the Person Act 
1861, was incompatible with article 8 to the extent that it interfered with 
consensual sexual behaviour between individuals. Parliament responded with the 
enactment of later primary legislation and section 62 was repealed in Northern 
Ireland by the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and the new provisions came into force 
on 1 May 2004.167       
  
In Bellinger v Bellinger,168 Mrs Bellinger was at birth in 1946 correctly classified 
and registered as a male.169 Mrs Bellinger was a post-operative male to female 
transsexual who got validly married to Mr Bellinger on 2 May 1971. Section 11(c) 
of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 provided that a marriage is void unless the 
parties are respectively male and female.170 Mrs Bellinger appealed against a 
decision of the trial court, that she was not validly married to her husband, by 
                                                            
166 McR’s Application for Judicial Review [2002] NIQB 58.  
167 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 44  available 
at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf (accessed on 08 November 2012).  
168 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21.  
169 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 para 3.   
170 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 para 1.  
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virtue of the fact that at law she was a man. The House of Lords declared section 
11(c) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 to be incompatible with Articles 8 and 
12 of the Convention, because it made no provision for the recognition of gender 
reassignment, and section 11(c) remains a continuing obstacle to Mr and Mrs 
Bellinger marrying each other.171Here, the response from parliament was the 
remedying of the situation by enacting the Gender Recognition Act of 2004, 
which came into force on 4 April 2005.172   
 
In R (on the application of Royal College of Nursing and others) v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department,173 the applicants challenged the lawfulness of a 
scheme established under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, which 
prohibits those placed on lists established under the scheme from working with 
children and or vulnerable adults.174 All the claimants alleged that the scheme is 
unlawful in four specific respects, inter alia, it is in breach of articles 6 and 8 of 
the Convention because it limited the right to representation prior to listing; it 
prevented individuals listed from an opportunity of a full merits review on appeal 
and; the minimum barring of 10 years is disproportionate.175 The court found that 
procedures which denied the right of a person to make representations as to why 
they should not be included on a barred list breached Article 6 and had the 
potential to give rise to breaches of Article 8 of the Convention.  
Section 67(2) and (6) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 amends Schedule 3 
to the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 and gives the person the 
opportunity to make representations as to why they should not be included in the 
                                                            
171 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21 para 50‐52.  
172 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 48 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf    (accessed on 08 November 2012).    
173 R (on the application of Royal College of Nursing and others) v Secretary of State for Home 
Department [2010] EWHC 2761.  
174 R (on the application of Royal College of Nursing and others) v Secretary of State for Home 
Department [2010] EWHC 2761 paras 1‐2.  
175 R (on the application of Royal College of Nursing and others) v Secretary of State for Home 
Department [2010] EWHC 2761 para 34.  
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children’s or adults’ barred list before a barring decision is made. These 
provisions commenced on 10 September 2012.176  
  
3.3.2.2.	Where	the	legislation	have	been	remedied	by	a	
remedial	order	under	section	10.		
 
In the case of R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the 
North and East London Region and the Secretary of State for Health,177 the 
applicant was convicted of manslaughter in the year 1988 and he was ordered to 
be detained in a hospital and to be subject to special restrictions. He was admitted 
to Broadmoor Hospital and in 1999 he applied to the Mental Health Tribunal for 
discharge pursuant to section 73 of the Act.178 The Court of Appeal held that 
sections 72 and 73 do not require the tribunal to discharge a patient if it cannot be 
shown that the patient is suffering from a mental disorder and the court concluded 
that sections 72 and 73 of the Mental Health Act 1983 is incompatible with 
Article 5(1) and 5(4) of the Convention.179 This case is a classical example where 
through a remedial order made in 2001, parliament responded by amending the 
Mental Health Act and the amendments came into force on 26 November 2001.180  
  
 
 
                                                            
176 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 57 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf   (accessed on 08 November 2012).   
177 R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the Northern and East London 
Region and The Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 415. 
178 R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the Northern and East London 
Region and The Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 415 para 1.  
179 R (on the application of H) v Mental Health Review Tribunal for the Northern and East London 
Region and The Secretary of State for Health [2001] EWCA Civ 415 para 31.  
180 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p.43 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf    (accessed on 08 November 2012).  
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3.3.2.3.	Where	the	related	provisions	have	already	been	
remedied	by	primary	legislation	at	the	time	of	the	
declaration.		
 
In the case of R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department v Hindawi and another,181 the first applicant a 
British national and the second applicant a foreign national who was sentenced to 
18 and 45 years imprisonment respectively. The applicants contended that the 
early release provisions of the Criminal Justice Act were discriminatory because it 
was in breach of their rights under articles 5 and14 of the Convention. They 
claimed that it denied them a right enjoyed by long-term prisoners serving 
determinate sentences of less than 15 years or life sentences prisoners as well as 
the right to be released on the recommendation of the Parole Board. The House of 
Lords declared sections 46(1) and 50(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 
incompatible with article 14 in conjunction with article 5 of the Convention, to the 
extent that these sections prevented prisoners liable for removal from having their 
cases reviewed by the Parole Board in the same manner as other long term 
prisoners.  
This case is a classical example of a situation where the related provisions had 
already been repealed by primary legislation at the time of the declaration. 
Sections 46(1) and 50(2) of the Criminal Justice Act 1991 had already been 
repealed and replaced by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, but they continued to 
apply on a transitional basis to offences committed before 4 April 2005.The 
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 have amended the Criminal Justice 
Act 1991 to remove the incompatibility in the transitional cases. The amended   
came into force on 14 July 2008.182    
 
                                                            
181 R (Clift) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v Hindawi and another [2006] UKHL 54.  
182 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 53 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf  (accessed on 08 November 2012).   
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Considering the case law examined in this chapter, it appears as if the courts have 
in most cases exercised strong review power when conducting a section 3 
interpretation. In the cases where it was however impossible for the courts to find 
a Convention-compatible interpretation of legislation, and declared legislation 
Convention-incompatible under section 4, it appears as if there was parliamentary 
response in all the cases. It can also be safely inferred from parliament’s response, 
that, there is a two-way communication between courts and parliament as a result 
of the courts declaratory powers in section 4.  
 
3.4.	The	opinions	of	legal	authors:	activism	or	constraint.		
 
The question of when it is no longer possible to interpret legislation compatible 
with the Convention and when to make a declaration of Convention-
incompatibility remains a question that is open for debate amongst legal scholars. 
Constitutional law scholars takes different standpoints on the issue of how broad a 
section 3 interpretation should be, therefore this issue is often the topic of debate 
amongst legal authors, academics and sometimes judges too.  
3.4.1.	Legal	scholars	in	support	of	judicial	activism.		
 
Kavanagh for example argues that the “metaphor of dialogue is equally applicable 
not only to section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act of England,183 but also to 
ordinary instances of statutory interpretation whereby parliament enacts the 
legislation and the courts interpret it by determining its meaning when applied to a 
particular case”. Kavanagh argue that, “even if we accept that encouraging 
dialogue is one of the purposes of the Human Rights Act to which the courts 
should give effect, this does not support the conclusion that section 4 is the only 
                                                            
183 Kavanagh A ‘Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Judicial 
reasoning after Ghaidan v Mendoza’  in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman  
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act  (2007) 135. 
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or even the primary way of fulfilling that purpose, but it could also be carried out 
by adopting an interpretation under section 3”.184     
Allan for example is of the view that, “by preserving the validity, continuing 
operation, and enforcement of incompatible primary legislation, the Human 
Rights Act upholds a formal principle of parliamentary sovereignty”. In 
substance, Allan hold, “it acknowledges that the meaning of formally valid 
statutory provisions depends on considerations of justice, rooted in a legal 
tradition of respect for basic values of individual liberty and human dignity. The 
idea that legislation is superior to precedent as a source of law is accurate enough 
for everyday purposes, but it obscures the truth that, in the last analysis, a statute 
obtains its meaning from its context of application”.185Allan, however, is of the 
opinion that “in the great majority of cases, section 3 is likely to be applicable, for 
the intention to comply with the Convention can normally be safely assumed and 
the necessary adjustments made to the statutory language – or a suitably charitable 
reading adopted without any constitutional overreaching”.186  
Allan is of the view that, “if we acknowledge a duty to interpret statutes in 
accordance with the rule of law, the relevant parliamentary intent must be 
constructed, rather than discovered or surmised. It is a matter of forging the best 
reconciliation we can between the statute’s literal provisions, on the one hand, and 
the demands in the context of constitutional principle, on the other. When those 
demands are urgent and pressing, adherence to an overly literal, or prima-facie 
reading can amount to constitutional vandalism”.187 
                                                            
184 Kavanagh A ‘Choosing between sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998: Judicial 
reasoning after Ghaidan v Mendoza ‘ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger Masterman 
Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (2007) 136. 
185 Allan T ‘Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights Act in 
Constitutional Practice’ 47.  available at http://www.clp.oxfordjournals.org (accessed on 03 July 
2012).      
186 Allan T ‘Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights Act in 
Constitutional Practice’ 41  available at http:// www.clp.oxfordjournals.org (accessed on 03 July 
2012).    
187 Trevor Allan “Parliament’s Will and the Justice of the Common Law: The Human Rights Act in 
Constitutional Practice”  44 available at  http:// www.clp.oxfordjournals.org (accessed on 03 July 
2012).    
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van Zyl Smit, in total contradiction with Klug, is in support of the courts, crossing 
legislative boundaries while conducting a section 3 interpretation. van Zyl Smit is 
of the view that there is pressure on courts in cases under the HRA “to do more 
than just interpret, to do something verging on amendment”. According to van Zyl 
Smit, this pressure stem from the widely held view that section 3 also plays a 
“remedial role” under the framework of the HRA”. The sense in which section 3 
is remedial, van Zyl Smit hold, is that it “enables judges to protect Convention 
rights which would have otherwise been breached if the statute governing the case 
was interpreted according to ordinary principles of statutory interpretation”.188  
 
3.4.2.	Legal	scholars	in	support	of	judicial	constraint.		
 
Klug, for example, is not in support the fact that courts cross should cross 
legislative boundaries while conducting an interpretation in terms of section 3 and 
therefore hold that “by concluding that there cannot be ‘no-go’ areas for judges 
under the Human Rights Act does not, however, necessarily require them to 
intrude on the rightful role of elected and accountable politicians”. Klug argues   
that the HRA was specifically structured to allow the courts to uphold rights while 
also retaining parliamentary authority. Behind the construction of sections 3 and 
4, according to Klug, was a “carefully tough-out constitutional arrangement that 
sought to inject principles of parliamentary accountability and transparency into 
judicial proceedings without removing whole policy areas to judicial 
determination”. Sections 3 and 4, Klug says, “sought to create a new dynamic 
between the judicial and legislative branches of the state”.189 Klug is of the 
opinion that the approach could be called “a dialogue approach or a relationship 
approach in which the institutions of the state influences each other, rather than 
                                                            
188 van Zyl Smit J ‘HRA section 3 and the limits of statutory interpretation’  available at 
www.statutelawsociety.org (accessed on 20 September 2012).   
189 Klug F ‘Judicial Deference Under The Human Rights Act 1998’ (2003) Issue 2  E.H.R.L.R. 125‐133 
130‐131.   
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the role of the judiciary being the police or correct the wrong decisions of the 
legislature”.190  
 
Kyritsis also argue that judges should exercise constraint during their 
interpretation process. Kyritsis describes the courts and the legislature as “partners 
to a joint enterprise and as such partners, courts and legislatures ought to be 
responsive to each other’s contributions and to the distinctive values that each 
brings to the common project”.191 According to Kyritsis, “constitutional review in 
its paradigmatic form is compatible with the assignment of an active role to the 
legislature by virtue of the fact that the role of the judge is remains subsidiary to 
that of the legislature”.192      
 
3.5.	Conclusion.			
 
In September 2012 Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice by 
Command of Her Majesty has presented a report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the government’s response to human rights judgments. It has 
been reported that since the HRA 1998 came into force on 2 October 2000, only 
27 declarations of incompatibility have been made. Of these declarations, inter 
alia, 19 have become final and were not subject to further appeals. Eight 
declarations have been overturned on appeal. Of the 19 declarations of 
incompatibility that have become final, 11 have been remedied by later primary 
legislation; three have been remedied by a remedial order under section 10 of the 
HRA; four related to provisions that had already been remedied by primary 
                                                            
190 Klug F ‘Judicial Deference Under The Human Rights Act 1998’  (2003) Issue 2 E.H.R.L.R. 125‐133  
131.  
191 Kyritsis D ‘Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy’ (2012) 32 No.2 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 297‐324  298.   
192 Kyritsis D ‘Constitutional Review in Representative Democracy’ (2012) 32 No.2 Oxford Journal 
of Legal Studies 297‐324  318.   
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legislation at the time of the declaration and; one is under consideration as to how 
to remedy the incompatibility.193   
Although, in terms of section 4 of the HRA, courts are only permitted to make a 
declaration of Convention-incompatibility, the courts can still give effect to 
Convention rights by exercising strong review through its interpretive freedom 
afforded to it through section 3 of the HRA. Section 3, by conferring this 
interpretive freedom upon courts, appears to be reducing the parliamentary 
dominance over legislation, and it is therefore placing a ‘trump card’ in the hands 
of the courts. Although section 3 requires the courts to follow an interpretation 
that is consistent with the ECHR, it appears as if section 3 is rather silent on how 
and to what extent a section 3- interpretation should be, except for ‘as far as 
possible to do so’.  
Considering the wording of section 3 of the HRA, inter alia, ‘as far as it is 
possible to do so’ one can assume that the Act has given mush discretion upon the 
courts during a section 3 interpretation. I humbly and carefully would rephrase the 
sections as to mean ‘do whatever is possible to do’ during a section 3 
interpretation process. On the assumption that I have correctly rephrased the 
section, I would suggest that the courts would have to attempt everything 
interpretatively possible in order to make the legislation Convention-compatible 
before opting for a section 4 declaration. This ‘as far as it is possible to do so’ or 
on my rephrased version ‘do whatever is possible to do’ is evident of the wide 
discretionary and interpretive power that is vested in the courts through section 3. 
By considering this interpretive power and discretion afforded to courts, one can 
safely assume that ‘as far as possible to do so’ or rephrased as ‘ do whatever is 
possible to do’ means that use whatever remedy that can possibly be used to make 
legislation Convention-compliant. Thus, the remedies available to courts under 
the HRA, appears to be very brought, except for the fact that it cannot compel 
parliament to comply with or to act in accordance with its orders.  
                                                            
193 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 40 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf  (accessed on 08 November 2012).  
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It appears as if the HRA had, through section 3, conferred a status of partial or 
limited judicial supremacy upon courts for as far as a section 3 interpretation of 
legislation is concerned. Therefore one can safely infer from the status conferred 
upon courts through section 3 that even if parliament enact laws that infringes 
upon Convention rights, courts have the interpretive freedom to give relief and to 
give effect to Convention rights. It appears as if parliament, through its response 
towards declarations of Convention-incompatibility, is de facto accepting 
responsibility to amend or repeal Convention-incompatible legislation, but this de 
facto taking of responsibility by parliament, although viewed as an institutional 
dialogue by some authors, is not enough. It would have been a more secured 
dialogue if parliament has a de jure responsibility towards Convention-
incompatible legislation.   
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CHAPTER	FOUR:	JUDICIAL	REVIEW	IN	POST‐APARTHEID	SOUTH	
AFRICA	UNDER	THE	CONSTITUTION,	1996	
 
4.1	 Introduction	
		
On 5 April 1937 the then Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of South 
Africa ruled in Ndlwana v Hofmeyer that the South African Parliament was 
sovereign (that is, no longer subject to the imperial Parliament in London after the 
Statute of Westminster, 1931) and that the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty 
meant that the court had no power to test the validity of an Act of Parliament, not 
even on procedural grounds.194 This position was overturned 15 years later in 
1952, when the same court ruled in Harris v Minister of the Interior that the South 
African courts may indeed review or test the legislative work of Parliament, but 
on procedural grounds alone.195 This remained the position in South Africa for the 
next three decades: South African courts could only challenge impugned laws on 
procedural grounds, but did not have the power to declare a piece of legislation 
invalid and unconstitutional, nor could the courts make an order of 
unconstitutionality in respect of the conduct of the President.196 As George 
Devenish remarks “the passing of the Statute of Westminster in 1931 gave birth to 
this system of parliamentary sovereignty”.197  
 
The early 1990s brought a dramatic end to the Westminster model of 
parliamentary sovereignty in South Africa. Heinz Klug claims that “with the 
adoption of the Interim Constitution [in 1994] the history of constitutionalism in 
South Africa could be summarised as the rise and fall of parliamentary 
                                                            
194 Ndlwana v Hofmeyer 1937 AD 229 238. The court ruled that an Act of Parliament proved itself 
on production of the duly published version and that “the procedure express of implied in the 
South Africa Act is so far as Courts of Law are concerned at the mercy of Parliament like 
everything else” (238).  
195 1952 (2) SA 428 (AD). 
196 Meintjies‐Van der Walt L (et al) Introduction to South African Law: Fresh Perspectives 2nd ed 
(2011) 45.     
197 Devenish GE  A Commentary on the South African Constitution (1998) 9.  
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sovereignty”.198 Devenish agrees that “the constitution is the highest law in the 
land, and that parliament is no longer sovereign as is the position in the 
Westminster model, but the 1996 constitution creates a new grundnorm for the 
state and the body politic”.199  
 
Constitutional sovereignty or supremacy under the 1996 Constitution implies two 
things: (i) legislation in conflict with the Constitution is legally invalid,200 and (ii) 
the Constitutional Court is the final adjudicator of the constitutional validity of 
legislation.201 Unlike its Canadian and British counterparts, the 1996 Constitution 
links the idea of constitutional supremacy and constitutional democracy to strong 
form judicial review, based in large part on an extensive Bill of Rights, as 
inherited via Germany from the United States of America.202 This implies a new 
role for the courts and a different relationship between the courts and the other 
branches of government. 
The fundamental nature of the break with the past has been a constant theme in 
the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. In Executive Council of the Western 
Cape Legislature v President of the RSA the court stated: 
The new Constitution establishes a fundamentally different order to that 
which previously existed. Parliament can no longer claim supreme power 
subject to limitations imposed by the Constitution; it is subject in all 
respects to the provisions of the Constitution and has only the powers vested 
in it by the Constitution expressly or by necessary implication.203 
 
It is important at this stage to point out that South Africa has a history of social 
and racial inequalities and apartheid. The fall of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
1990s thus coincided with a constitutional commitment to redress the inequalities 
of the past within a system that caters for the rights of both the majority and the 
minority. This ideal of an egalitarian and human rights orientated society 
                                                            
198 Klug H ‘The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual Analysis’ (2010) 6.    
199 Devenish GE A Commentary on the South African Constitution (1998) 36. 
200 Section 2 of the Constitution read with section 172(1)(a). 
201 Section 167(5) of the Constitution. 
202 Currie I and De Waal J The new Constitutional and Administrative law: Volume 1 Constitutional 
law (2001) 21 37. 
203 1995 (4) SA 877 (CC) para 62. 
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supported the birth of a new Constitutional Court, which has become the final 
interpreter and the biggest source of protection of the rights entrenched in the 
South African constitution.204 The Constitution and its interpretation by the 
Constitutional Court in particular, Heinz Klug holds, “have become a central 
pillar of South African law”.205 As Karl Klare understood from the outset, the new 
task of the court is essentially to facilitate change in the regulatory state, and not, 
as in in the liberal tradition, to guard the rights of individuals against the state.206 
In S v Makwanyane Mohamed J stated that: 
 
the South African constitution retains from the past only what is defensible and 
represent a decisive break from and ringing rejection of, that part of the past 
which is disgracefully racist, authoritarian, insular and repressive, and a vigorous 
identification of and commitment to a democratic, universalistic, caring and 
aspirationally egalitarian ethos expressly articulated in the constitution.207  
 
In Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism 
and Others, Ngcobo J stated that: 
 
South Africa is a society in transition. It is a transition from a society based on 
inequality to one that is based on equality. This transition was introduced by the 
interim constitution which was designed to create a new order based on equality in 
which there is equality between men and women and people of all races so that all 
citizens should be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental rights and 
freedoms.208 
 
As said before, it is to ensure the enjoyment of all constitutional rights and 
freedoms that the Constitution confers upon the Superior Courts, inter alia, the 
High Courts, the Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court, the 
power to exercise a strong form of judicial review. In terms of section 167(5) read 
with sections 2 and 172(1)(a), the South African Constitutional Court, unlike its 
                                                            
204 The Constitutional Court was formally opened by former President Nelson Mandela on 14 
February 1995 see http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/site/thecourt/history.htm#why 
(accessed on 07 August 2012).  
205 Klug H The Constitution of South Africa: A Contextual Analysis (2010)  6.   
206 Klare K 'Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism' (1998) 14 SAJHR 146.  
207 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 262.  
208 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) 
SA 490 (CC) para73. 
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Canadian and British counterparts, has the final authority to declare that a rights 
violation has occurred and that law or conduct is thus legally invalid.   
At first glance, this strong review power might appear completely incompatible 
with the idea of inter-branch constitutional dialogue as developed by Hogg and 
rather as an example of liberal constitutionalism. However, the Constitution also 
softens this strong review power by creating the opportunity for the other 
branches to respond to a judicial finding that a rights violation has occurred. This 
might happen during the limitation analysis under section 36 or during the 
remedial stage of litigation under sections 38 and 172(1)(b). By creatively using 
these open-ended provisions, the court may, as a matter of judicial policy, enter 
into a facilitating dialogue with the other branches of the development state by, in 
effect, turning its strong review powers into a system of weak review. Even more 
important in this regard is section 39(2) which, like section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act, embodies the weak review power to re-interpret existing law in line with the 
spirit, object and purport of the Bill of Rights.  
 
This chapter takes a closer look at these operational provisions of the Constitution 
and the different approaches to judicial review and institutional dialogue which 
these provisions imply. These provisions have understandably given rise to 
different understandings about the proper degree of judicial activism (strong 
review power) and restraint (weak review power) required under the South 
African constitution. Leading constitutional law authors have different viewpoints 
about which form of judicial review will best suit the transformative aspirations of 
the South African constitution. The chapter introduces and critically discusses 
some of the viewpoints offered by these authors and academics. Finally, the 
chapter also focuses on the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. Specific 
landmark decisions will be discussed to illustrate how the Court has struggled to 
find the appropriate balance between constitutional design (mandating strong 
form review) and constitutional practice (often necessitating weak form review 
and deference to the other branches of government as partners in a contested and 
ongoing constitutional dialogue).  
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4.2	Review	powers	by	constitutional	design		
	
4.2.1	Provisions	supporting	strong	review	
	
The Constitution provides that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the 
legislature, executive, judiciary and all organs of state,209 and that all law or 
conduct which is inconsistent with the constitution is invalid, and the obligations 
imposed by it must be fulfilled.210 These provisions are supplemented with section 
172 which reads as follows:  
(1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its powers, a court –  
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the 
constitution is invalid to the extent of its inconsistency; and 
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including –  
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the 
declaration of invalidity; and 
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any 
period and on any conditions, to allow the competent 
authority to correct the defect. 
 
Section 172 must be read with section 38 which provides that anyone listed in the 
section has the right to approach a competent court, alleging that a right in the Bill 
of Rights has been infringed or threatened, and that the court may then grant 
"appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights". As Currie and De Waal 
points out, the constitution itself provides very little guidance on constitutional 
remedies but "sanction a flexible approach to remedies", because it only states that 
the remedies must be appropriate.211  
The discretionary or directory nature of sections 38 and 172(1)(b) contrast sharply 
it the peremptory nature of section 172(1)(a). Where the Court finds that a rights 
                                                            
209 Section 8(1).  
210 Section 2.  
211 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2005) 195.  
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violation cannot be justified, it has no choice but to exercise its strong review 
powers and to declare the unconstitutional law or conduct legally invalid.  Section 
172(1)(b) allows the Court to combine this strong review power with a strong 
remedy such as reading in (converting the Court into the legislature),212 or a 
structural interdict (converting the Court into the executive).213 On face value, 
section 172 tells us that the constitution has vested unlimited and absolute judicial 
review powers in the Constitutional Court, because the constitutional court is the 
court of final instance in all constitutional matters and, in terms of section 167(3), 
its decisions cannot be overturned by another institution, court or forum.   
Section 167 prescribes the composition of the Constitutional Court, as well as the 
scope and boundaries of the powers that the Court is allowed to exercise.214 It 
confers upon the Constitutional Court the highest rank in the hierarchy of the 
courts in South Africa. Currently, in terms of section 167, the Constitutional Court 
is only limited to constitutional matters, and in this regard it is the final arbiter 
with regards to the constitutional matters.215 Section 167(3) confers upon the 
Constitutional Court the final voice on whether an Act of parliament or a 
provincial Act or the conduct of the President is constitutional. The Constitutional 
Court must confirm any order of invalidity made by the Supreme Court of Appeal, 
a High Court or a court of similar status before that order has any force.216  
There is no doubt that the constitutional drafters designed a specialist apex court 
in constitutional matters, the Constitutional Court, with extremely strong powers 
of review. 
 
 
                                                            
212 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1999 (1) 
SA 6 (CC).  
213 Nyathi v Members of the Executive Council for the Department of Health Gauteng Case CCT 
19/07 [2008] ZACC 8.  
214 Section 167(1) and (2).  
215 Section 167(3).   
216 Section 167(5) read with sections 172(2)(a).  
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4.2.2	Provisions	supporting	weak	review		
 
A finding that a right in the Bill of Rights has been violated is not conclusive of 
the question whether the violating law or conduct is unconstitutional and legally 
invalid. The Constitution prescribes a process of rights analysis in which such a 
finding only constitutes the first step in a two stage process. Section 36 read with 
section 7(3) provides for the limitation of rights in the Bill of Rights, but only in 
terms of a law of general application and to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. The court has a wide discretion to determine 
whether a rights violation is justifiable or not and must take into account all 
relevant factors, including the nature of the right; the importance of the purpose of 
the limitation; the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose.217   
As explained by Currie and De Waal the rights and freedoms in the constitution 
are not absolute:  
A law that limits a right infringes the right, but the infringement will not be 
unconstitutional if it takes place for a reason that is accepted as a 
justification for infringing rights in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom. The reasons for limiting a right need 
to be exceptionally strong.”218 
 
This limitation analysis involves a two-stage process, and in this regard, the court 
asks two questions. The first is whether a right in the Bill of Rights has been 
infringed by law or conduct. The second (which necessary depends on a positive 
answer to the first question) is whether the infringement can be justified as a 
permissible limitation of the right.219 The limitation of constitutional rights for a 
purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the 
                                                            
217 Section 36(1); see also S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) para 104.    
218 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th  ed (2005) 163‐164.  
219 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  5th ed (2005) 166; see also S v Zuma 1995 (1) 
SACR 568 (CC) para 21.  
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weighing up of competing values, and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality.220   
The burden of proof during the limitation analysis rests on the party relying on the 
legislation to establish this justification (most often the state department 
responsible for the administration of legislation or a government policy).221 
Section 36 provides the basis for a structured dialogue between the judiciary 
(having made a finding that legislation or conduct violates a right) and the other 
branches of government (responding to the judicial finding by explaining and 
justifying the policy objectives or reasons behind the rights violation). While the 
Court retains the final word on the justifiability of a rights violation pursuant to a 
government policy objective, the open-ended wording of section 36 allows for 
different degrees of deference towards the other branches of government and by 
design thus invites weaker forms of judicial review (based on low levels of 
scrutiny, such as rationality, and deference to the legislature and complexity of 
policy and law making in a modern development state).  
Having found that a rights violation cannot be justified the Court is compelled, as 
was said above, to declare the law or conduct unconstitutional and legally invalid. 
However, the remedial provisions introduced above allow a Court to suspend or 
otherwise undermine the finality of the declaration of validity in order to give the 
offending branch of government an opportunity to respond to the declaration of 
invalidity. Section 172(1)(b)(ii) explicitly provides for this possibility as was 
designed to ensure that the legislature and executive are given a meaningful 
chance to respond to the exercise of the testing right by the Constitutional Court. 
The open-ended wording of section 172(1)(b) allows the court to combine its 
strong review powers with weak remedies and so to ensure ongoing institutional 
dialogue with the other branches of government after the litigation. 
The invitation for weaker forms of review implicit in sections 36 and 172(1)(b)(ii) 
find explicit recognition in section 39(2) which provides as follows: 
                                                            
220 S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) para 104.   
221 S v Makwanyane 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) para 102.  
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When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or 
customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights.222  
  
In sharp contrast to the strong review power entailed by the remedial process of 
reading in after a declaration of constitutional invalidity, section 39(2) invites the 
indirect application of the Bill of Rights and the constitutional review of 
legislation through its creative re-interpretation only. The section is similar to 
section 3 of the HRA in the United Kingdom and thus a classical example of a 
weak form of review. An interpretation as provided for in section 39(2) results in 
an interpretation where the court will not declare the legislation to be invalid and 
inconsistent with the constitution, but the court is using the reading strategy of 
reading down in order to find an interpretation that is promoting the spirit, purport 
and objects of the Bill of Rights. The constitution of South Africa provides that 
the courts must use an interpretation that promote the spirit, purport and object of 
the Bill of Rights, but the superior courts in South Africa, unlike its British 
counterpart, can declare legislation unconstitutional if a section 39(2) 
interpretation is not possible. 
 
4.3	The	reviews	powers	exercised:	a	few	examples	from	the	case	law	
 
The Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence contains numerous examples of the both 
strong and weak form review. This jurisprudence is too comprehensive to discuss 
in detail here and one or two examples will have to suffice.  
Classical examples of strong form review include S v Makwanyane (in which the 
Court declared the death penalty unconstitutional) and more recently JASA v 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others223 (in which the Court 
declared the extension of the term of the Chief Justice unconstitutional). These 
judgments left no room for further legislative or executive action in response to 
the judgments (short of constitutional amendment).  
                                                            
222 Constitutional of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s.39(2).  
223 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2011] 
ZACC 23.  
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In a number of cases the court could have deferred the problem back to the 
legislature to remedy but refused to do so, thus opting to combine its strong 
review powers with a strong remedy. The classical example remains National 
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others224 (in 
which the court opted to resolve the problem itself by acting as a quasi-legislature 
and amending the legislative provision in question by reading words into the text. 
In Fourie v Minister of Home Affairs225the Court was divided on the question 
whether parliament should be shown deference and involved in the development 
of the law. The majority opted to suspend the declaration of unconstitutionality to 
allow a coherent policy response from government. The minority, per O’Regan J, 
saw no need to keep the matter open and to allow the legislature time to develop a 
response and preferred to remedy the unconstitutional legislation by reading 
words into the Act. More recently, the Court opted for the approach of O’Regan J 
in C v Department of Health and Social Development, Gauteng.226 In the latter 
judgment the court declared and remedied. While the matter was resolved without 
further dialogue with the legislature, the Court reveals itself particularly sensitive 
to the dialogical relationship between the branches of government. Both Yacoob J 
and Skweyiya J took special time to explain the status of the remedial intervention 
by the Court.  
Glenister shows that the Court is willing to exercise strong review powers even in 
the absence of clear textual authority in the Constitution. In Glenister v Predident 
of the Republic of South Africa227case. The ANC as the ruling party adopted a 
resolution at its national conference in Polokwane calling for a single police 
service and the dissolution of the Directorate of Special Operations (DSO). The 
applicant’s main complaint in the Constitutional Court was the disbanding of the 
DSO and its replacement with the Directorate of Priority Crime investigation 
DPCI.228 The court was concerned with whether the establishment of the DPCI 
                                                            
224 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Others 1999 (1) SA 6 
(CC).  
225 Fourie and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2003 (5) SA 301 (CC).   
226 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 1.  
227 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC).  
228 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 63.  
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was rationally connected to a legitimate governmental purpose.229The court held 
that the evidence cannot be said to establish that the purpose of parliament as 
reflected in the impugned laws was to protect leaders of the ANC230, as contented 
by the applicant231, and the court therefore dismissed the challenged based on 
rationality.  
The court held that public confidence in mechanisms that are designed to secure 
independence is indispensable232, and the provisions creating the DPCI fails to 
afford it an adequate measure of autonomy and it lacks the degree of 
independence arising from the constitutional duty on the state to protect and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights, mainly because the DPCI is insufficiently insulated 
from political influences in its structure and functioning.233The court held that 
failure on the part of the state to create a sufficiently independent anti-corruption 
entity infringes a number of rights, including, the right to equality, human dignity, 
freedom, security of the person, administrative justice and socio-economic rights, 
including the right to education, housing and health.234 Finally the court declared 
Chapter 6A of the South African Police Services Act inconsistent with the 
constitution and invalid to the extent that it fails to secure an adequate degree of 
independence for the Directorate for priority Crimes Investigation,235and 
suspended the declaration of invalidity for a period of eighteen months in order to 
give parliament the opportunity to render the defect.236 
The Constitutional Court makes a number of remedies available to the superior 
courts, especially the Constitutional Court during judicial review. Michael Bishop 
describes SA’s constitutional remedies as “seeking not only to redress the 
immediate problems before the court but attempt to deter future infringement”.237 
                                                            
229 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 68.  
230 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 69. 
231 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 61.  
232 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC) para 207.  
233 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC), para 208.  
234 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC), para 198.  
235 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC), para 251.5. 
236 Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa 2011 (3) SA 347 (CC), para 251.6. 
237 Bishop M in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M Constitutional Law of South Africa Student 
Edition (2007)  9‐3.   
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According to Currie and De Waal, constitutional remedies are “forward-looking, 
individualistic and retributive”.238 
These remedies include, granting appropriate relief, including a declaration of 
rights,239 inherent power to protect and regulate their own process and to develop 
the common law,240 declaration of inconsistency and invalidity, suspending a 
declaration of invalidity, a temporary interdict or temporary relief.241 The courts 
can also use reading down, when it ‘remedies’ the constitutional defect by 
ensuring that the statute does not bear an unconstitutional bearing.242 The remedy 
of reading-in is also available to the courts, and instead of removing words from 
legislation, when a court reads-in it adds words to the statute to cure the 
constitutional defect.243 Opposite to reading-in, the courts can use severance when 
one part of the legislation is severed or cut from the rest of the legislation, and it is 
appropriate when only part of the legislation is invalid.244 
 
In Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa,245 the applicant, a judge, 
challenged the constitutionality of sections 8 and 9 of the Judges’ Remuneration 
and Conditions of Employment Act 88 of 1989 and its regulations in respect of 
Judges administrative recess, leave, transport allowances, travelling and 
subsistence. Ms Satchwell stated that she and the late Ms Lesley Carnelley have 
been involved in an intimate, exclusive and permanent relationship since about 
1986. In terms of South African law, they were unable to enter into a valid 
                                                            
238 Currie and De Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  5th ed (2005) 196.  
239 Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, 1996 s.38.    
240 Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, 1996 s.173.  
241 Constitution of The Republic of South Africa, 1996 s172(1)and(2).  
242 Bishop M in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M Constitutional Law of South Africa Student 
Edition (2007) 9‐8.   
243Bishop M in Woolman S, Roux Tand Bishop M Constitutional Law of South Africa  Student 
Edition (2007) 9‐15.   
244 Bishop M in Woolman S, Roux Tand Bishop M Constitutional Law of South Africa Student 
Edition (2007) 9‐12.  
245 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC). 
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marriage, but they lived in every respect as a married couple and are 
acknowledged as such by their respective families and friends.246 
The applicant contended that the impugned provisions violated her right to 
equality in terms of section 9 of the constitution because they denied her and Ms 
Carnelley certain specific benefits that are generally afforded to judges and their 
spouses. The basis for her alleged unconstitutionality was that the omission from 
the provisions of the words “or partner in a permanent, same-sex life 
partnership”.247 
The court held that the denial of benefits to same-sex partners while affording 
them to married judges is, in effect, a differentiation on the grounds of sexual 
orientation which is a listed ground in section 9 of the constitution.248 The court 
has held that, from the date of the order the omission from the regulations of the 
Act, of the words “or partner in a permanent same-sex partnership in which the 
partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of support” is inconsistent with the 
constitution.249 The court finally held that the words “or partner in a permanent 
same-sex partnership in which the partners have undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support” must be read into the regulations of the Act.250      
Parliament responded to the Constitutional Court’s judgement, and the 1989 
Judges’ Remuneration and Conditions of employment Act was replaced on 22 
November 2001 by Act 47 of 2001, which is the new Act dealing with judge’s 
remuneration and conditions of employment. The 1995 regulation to the 1989 Act 
was also replaced by new regulations promulgated on 5 July 2002. The main 
differences between the 1989 legislation and the 2001 legislation is that the latter 
includes constitutional court judges within its scope, but still affords benefits only 
                                                            
246 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC) 
para 4.  
247 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC) 
para 14.  
248Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC) 
para 21.   
249 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC) 
para 37.2.3.  
250 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2001 (12) BCLR 1284 (CC) 
para 37.2.4.  
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to spouses of judges, and does not extend benefits to their permanent same-sex 
life partners,251 despite the constitutional court’s ruling in Satchwell.  
The applicant, for the second time, challenged the constitutionality of the 
amended law which still afforded benefits to spouses of certain judges, but not to 
permanent same-sex life partners who have undertaken reciprocal duties of 
support.252  The constitutional court, for a second time, held that the omission 
from section 9 and 10 of the Act, after the word spouse, of the words “or partner 
in a permanent same-sex life partnership in which the partners have undertaken 
reciprocal duties of support” is inconsistent with the constitution.253 
The two Satchwell judgments must not be misread as an example of a 
constitutional dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature. The first 
Satchwell judgment is a classical example of strong form review where the court 
combined a declaration of unconstitutionality with the strong and quasi-legislative 
remedy of reading in. The judgment left little or no room for a response from the 
legislature. The subsequent legislative amendment cannot be regarded as a 
response to the judgement by the Court but, on the contrary, simply disregarded 
the judicial intervention and amendment of the earlier Act. The second Satchwell 
judgment simply restated the legal position established in the first Satchwell 
judgment.  
Just as the jurisprudence reveals a tension between suspension or reading in 
(Fourie) there is also a tension between reading down (under section 39(2)) and 
reading in (under section 172(1)). A classical example of this tension is provided 
by Daniels v Campbell.254 The matter appeared before the Constitutional Court for 
confirmation on the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Intestate 
Succession Act and the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act. Both these two 
                                                            
251 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) para 2.  
252 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) para 12.   
253 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC) para 14.1.  
254 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14.   
 
 
 
 
 66 
 
Acts failed to include persons married according to Muslim rites as spouses for 
the purposes of these Acts.255  
Sachs J, writing for the majority court, defined the word spouse, in its ordinary 
meaning to include parties to a Muslim marriage, and that such a reading is not 
linguistically strained. The constitutional values of equality, tolerance and respect 
for diversity, the court held, point strongly in favour of giving the word spouse a 
broad and inclusive construction.256The majority held that the potential under-
inclusiveness and consequent discriminatory impact is avoided simply by 
correcting the interpretation, and that it is not necessary to follow the process the 
High Court felt compelled to do, that is, of making a declaration of invalidity 
coupled with a curative remedial reading-in.257The court then used reading down 
to include spouses to a marriage in terms of the Muslim rites.258 
However, in a strongly worded and argued minority judgment, Moseneke DJP 
defended the preference for strong review or weak review under the 
circumstances. The minority court held that the word spouse must be given a 
meaning limited to a party to a marriage valid in SA law and solemnised in 
accordance with the Marriage Act. Moseneke DJP was of the view that it is was 
just and equitable to cure the omission of Muslim spouses from the respective 
definitions of the Acts by reading-in appropriate words.259  
In C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng,260 the 
constitutionality of sections 151 and 152 of the Children’s Act was at issue. The 
impugned provisions provided for a child to be removed from family care by state 
officials and placed in temporary safe care, but do not provide for the child to be 
brought before the children’s court for automatic review of that removal.261 
                                                            
255 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14 para 1.  
256 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14 paras 19 – 21 and para 31.    
257 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14 para 34.  
258 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14 para 40.  
259 Daniels v Campbell and Others (CCT 40/03) 2004 ZACC 14 para 67.   
260 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 1.  
261 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 1 para 1.  
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The applicant contended that the absence of a provision for automatic review of 
the removal and placement in temporary safe care of the child is in breach of the 
children’s constitutional rights to family care or parental care, the best interests of 
the child being considered paramount and the rights to dignity and privacy to the 
extent that they include and protect the right to family life.262   
Skweyiya J writing for the minority found the limitations imposed by the sections 
of the Children’s Act to be unconstitutional263 and held that in the ordinary course, 
where reading-in can provide an effective remedy, it will generally be preferable 
to a bald declaration of invalidity and a suspensive order, coupled with interim 
relief.264The minority court held that, when reading words into a statute, the 
relevant considerations to be borne in mind are what the consequences of the 
order would be and whether they would amount to an unconstitutional intrusion 
into the legislative realm. The court must therefore define the reading-in in a 
sufficiently precise manner, which is in keeping with the legislative scheme, so as 
to impair the legislative purpose as little as possible while removing the 
constitutional complaint.265To cure the defect, the minority held, something must 
be added to these sections, and reading-in offers this solution.266 One passage 
from the minority judgment in C v Department of Health and Social 
Development, Gauteng that I consider worthy of repeating, is, in the words of 
Skweyiya J, that, 
by making a final order of this kind, however, I do not suggest that the Court has 
crowded-out parliament’s role in further investigating how best to serve the interests of 
children, for whom a removal from the home is necessary, and in enacting appropriate 
legislation. Indeed, a final order of reading-in does not give the judiciary the ultimate 
word on pronouncing on the law. Instead it initiates a conversation between the 
                                                            
262 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17.  
263 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 para 39.  
264 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 para 46.  
265 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 para 50.  
266 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 para 52.  
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legislature and the courts, for parliament’s legislative power to amend the remedy 
continues to subsist beyond the granting of the relief, and may be exercised within 
constitutionally permissible limits at any future time. I would therefore encourage the 
legislature to exercise its entitlement to alter the remedy, should it see fit to do so, in view 
of its specialist expertise and, of course, subject to its constitutional mandate.267 
Yacoob J, writing for the majority court, however, held that, it cannot be just and 
equitable, without qualification, either to declare the sections inconsistent with the 
constitution and invalid, or to suspend the order of invalidity to allow the 
legislature to remedy the defect. The majority court held that the only feasible 
way forward is reading-in, and this course will not unduly intrude into the domain 
of parliament because parliament can amend the statute at any time.268The court 
then finally read words into the sections.269   
It is not easy to postulate any principle which governs the Court’s exercise of its 
review powers and which could explain when the Court would exercise strong 
review powers and when not. The most controversial judgment in which the Court 
opted from a weak form of review is Grootboom v The Government of the 
Republic of South Africa and Others.270 Tushnet celebrates this case as an 
example of weak form review. However, Tushnet is not the only constitutional 
scholar with strong views about the appropriate level of review that the South 
African Constitutional Court should exercise.   
 
                                                            
267 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 1 para 57.  
268 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 paras 87,88 and 89.  
269 C v Department of Health and Social Development Gauteng and Others Case CCT 55/ 11[2012] 
ZACC 17 para 94.  
270 Grootboom v The Government of the Republic of South Africa and others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 
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4.4	Weaker	or	stronger?	The	views	of	academic	constitutional	scholars		
4.4.1	Scholarly	support	for	strong	forms	of	judicial	review	
	
The classical defence of strong form review in post-apartheid South Africa is 
provided by Karl Klare’s plea for transformative constitutionalism.271 Klare 
claimed that the post-apartheid Constitution is transformative in character (as 
opposed to preservative). His concern was that the post-apartheid judiciary would 
fail to develop the adjudicative methods and interpretive techniques that are 
implied by a transformative view of law. His concern was, and remains, how the 
inherited liberal legal culture (modes of reasoning and methods of interpretation) 
undermine the best transformative aspirations or demands of the Constitution. 
Klare provided a rich definition of transformative constitutionalism:272 
  
By transformative constitutionalism I mean a long-term project of 
constitutional enactment, interpretation, and enforcement committed […] to 
transforming a country's political and social institutions and power 
relationships in a democratic, participatory, and egalitarian direction. 
Transformative constitutionalism connotes an enterprise of inducing large-
scale social change through non-violent political processes grounded in law. 
 
Transformative constitutionalism describes an optimistic theory of social change 
through law (large scale; long term; court centred). Klare advocated the 
transformation of post-apartheid society through rights litigation and adjudication 
by pro-rights social movements and activist post-apartheid courts. He initially 
tried to sell this vision of the judicial role and nature of judicial power at a CALS 
Judges Conference in January 1995 (two weeks before first case was heard by the 
Constitutional Court). In the context of the mid 1990s, Klare's idea of 
transformative constitutionalism presented a vision of the Constitutional Court 
unrestrained by the traditional liberal attempt to limit the power of the court to 
purely legal matters. It was an open invitation to the Court to exercise its strong 
                                                            
271 Karl Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146. 
272 Karl Klare ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 SAJHR 146 150 (my 
emphasis). 
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review powers in the name of the social-democratic political morality implied by 
transformative constitutionalism as a substantive political morality.  
Frank Michelman, another US American legal scholar who attended the first 
CALS Judges Conference in 1995 shared similar views about the judicial role in 
society.273 According to Michelman, the task of the Court is to virtually represent 
political freedom (understood as deliberative self-government) to a political 
society which has been overtaken by the instrumental pursuit of private interests. 
Michelman argued that the constitutional drafters also adopted this view of the 
Constitutional Court when they decided to defer the decision about the 
constitutionality of the death penalty to the Court and deliberately left the text of 
the Constitution open-ended. This left the Court with no other ground for its 
decision but its own deliberative self-government express through an independent 
and autonomous substantive judgment: “judges best collaborate with the framers 
by exercising their own judgments as to ‘which proposed and contested reading or 
application best carries out the political project that is incompletely constituted by 
constitutional language and history”.274 
As far as section 39(2) is concerned, Michelman argues that that the section 
contains an express instruction, what he call a “constitution-conforming 
instruction”, to judges engaged in the interpretation of statutory terminology, 
according to which the judges must interpret legislation with a view to promoting 
the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, “presumably before deciding 
whether they must declare the statute invalid and resort (perhaps) to remedial 
reading in”.275 
At the end of the Court’s first year of jurisprudence, Alfred Cockrell coined the 
term “rainbow jurisprudence” to describe the superficiality of the early judgments 
of the Constitutional Court. The term reflected Cockrell’s attitude towards the 
                                                            
273 Michelman F ‘Constitutional authorship, “Solomonic solutions”, and the unoriginalist mode of 
constitutional interpretation’ (1998) Acta Juridica 208. 
274 Michelman F ‘Constitutional authorship, “Solomonic solutions”, and the unoriginalist mode of 
constitutional interpretation’ (1998) Acta Juridica 208 231. 
275 Michelman F ‘On the uses of interpretive “charity”: Some notes on application, avoidance, 
equality and objective constitutionality from the 2007 term of the constitutional court of South 
Africa’ (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review  24.   
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Court’s “unwillingness to apply substantive reasoning in its judgments in its first 
year of sitting in 1995”.276 According to Cockrell the interpretation of the bill of 
rights in the constitution involves the making of substantive value judgments.277 
He claimed that the Constitution signalled a transition from a formal to a 
substantive vision of law in South Africa.278 Cockrell claimed that the strong 
review powers of the Court should be grounded in robust substantive reasoning 
such as that provided by O’Regan J’s analysis of the value of dignity in S v 
Makwanyane and Ackermann J’s exploration of the meaning of freedom in 
Ferreira v Levin. According to Cockrell, these cases represent a “rigorous 
consideration of the substantive reasons that powers constitutional 
adjudication”.279 Cockrell describes Kriegler J’s dictum in S v Makwanyane that 
judges of the Constitutional Court are judges, not sages and that their discipline is 
the law, not ethics or philosophy and certainly not politics and Sachs J’s dictum in 
S v Makwanyane that inter alia their function is to interpret the law as it stands, 
and whatever their personal views on a subject might be, their response must be a 
purely legal one, “as an outright denial of the intrusion of substantive reasons into 
the process of constitutional adjudication”.280 
The academic support for strong form review does not only amount to a call for 
robust substantive reasoning, but also takes the form of a defence of the direct 
application of the Bill of Rights (rights analysis under section 36 and a definite 
finding under section 172) over the indirect application of the Bill of Rights 
(under section 39(2)). Stu Woolman is of the view that “the words ‘all law’ in 
section 8 of the Bill of Rights subject all legal disputes that engage a specific 
substantive provision found in sections 9 to 35 of the Bill of Rights to the direct 
application of the Bill of Rights”.281 Woolman is contending that  
                                                            
276 Cockrell A ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 11.  
277 Cockrell A ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 2.  
278 Cockrell A ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 3.  
279 Cockrell A ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 13.  
280 Cockrell A ‘Rainbow Jurisprudence’ (1996) 12 SAJHR 1 14. Cockrell’s defence of substantive 
constitutional interpretation must be read against the background of Ronald Dworkin’s influential 
defence of a moral reading of the US American Constitution (Dworkin R  ‘Freedom’s Law :The 
Moral Reading of the American Constitution’  (1999) 34). 
281 Woolman S ‘The Amazing Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ 762 773.    
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when the prescriptive content of the substantive rights does not engage the 
law or conduct at issue, then section 39(2), interpretation and development 
of the law can take place, and when indirect application is given priority 
over direct application, it does too much work and turns all of section 8 into 
surplusage and makes sections 8(2) and 8(3) redundant.282   
 
The over-reliance on section 39, Woolman argues, might also have the unintended 
result of undermining the rule of law, and the two-step interpretive process 
designed by the drafters of the Bill of Rights which ought to produce black letter 
constitutional law. The use of section 39(2) to avoid robust substantive reasoning 
might be “useful in cobbling together majorities on the Constitutional Court” but, 
insists Woolman, “often leaves readers of a judgment at an absolute loss as to how 
the Bill of Rights might operate in some future matter”.283 Woolman is directing 
his critique against the influential view of Iain Currie that the post-apartheid 
Constitutional Court would do bets to avoid substantive moral reasoning as far as 
possible. It is to this call for a judicial policy of weak and tentative forms of 
review that my attention turns next. 
 
4.4.2	Scholarly	support	for	weak	forms	of	judicial	review	
 
Iain Currie writes that “to have the last word on the meaning of the Constitution is 
at once an awesome power and a power in name only since it cannot be exercised 
without the co-operation of the other branches of the state”.284 In direct reaction to 
the call by Cockrell and others for substantively deep and broad constitutional 
review, Currie favours decisions that are narrow and shallow. Relying on the work 
of Cass Sunstein, Currie called for judicial minimalism and the judicious 
avoidance of controversial issues of political morality.285 According to him, “the 
strategy of deciding as little as possible and leaving as much as possible 
                                                            
282 Woolman S ‘The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of Rights’ (2007) 124 SALJ  762 777.   
283 Woolman S ‘True in Theory, True in Practice: Why Direct Application still matters’ in Woolman 
S Constitutional Conversations (2008) 113 135.  
284 Currie I  ‘Judicious Avoidance’ (1999) 15 SAJHR 138 158.   
285 Currie I in Woolman S (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 32‐17; see also Currie 
and de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook  5th ed (2005) 161.  
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undecided is a strategy that is particularly useful to courts, which are required to 
decide an issue rapidly and efficiently and to justify their decision”.  
Currie explicitly defends this weaker form of tentative review on grounds of 
separation of powers or what I have described throughout this thesis as the 
possibility of co-operative dialogue between the judiciary and the other branches 
of government:  
[A] political motivation in favour of minimalism is that it provides a means 
of negotiating the problem of counter-majoritarianism, and avoidance is one 
way of keeping out of the way of democratic institutions. Minimalism is a 
recognition that the democratic institutions rather than the courts are the 
most appropriate ‘forums of principle’ in society and, particularly on issues 
of great public controversy, should be given room to make wide-ranging 
rules and to debate the substantive principles underlying those rules: Good 
judges recognise that fundamental decisions are made democratically.286 
 
As far as section 39(2) is concerned, Wessel le Roux also claims (against the 
views of Woolman) that weak form review, or the consistent preference for 
section 39(2) interventions and the indirect application of the Bill of Rights over 
section 172 interventions and direct application, is needed to sustain the diversity 
of constitutional meaning that he associates with the idea of an open and 
democratic democracy.287 Le Roux complains that the Constitutional Court has 
not been “particularly creative in exploring the opportunities which the principle 
of [...] reading-down offered the cause of legal and societal transformation in 
post-apartheid South Africa”.288 
Lourens du Plessis is also in support of judicial review centred on the application 
of section 39(2). In response to the debate between Cockrell and Currie, or what 
he calls constitutional absolutism and constitutional minimalism, Du Plessis 
argues that both stances are unacceptable. He suggests that the extremes of both 
positions are best prevented by “properly invoking subsidiarity as a constitutional 
                                                            
286 Currie I ‘Judicious Avoidance’ 15 SAJHR 138 1999 149‐150.   
287 Le Roux W ‘Undoing the past through statutory interpretation: the Constitutional Court and 
the marriage laws of apartheid’ (2005) 26 Obiter 526. 
288 Le Roux W ‘Undoing the past through statutory interpretation: the Constitutional Court and 
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 74 
 
reading strategy”.289 Adjudicative subsidiarity, du Plessis suggests, “also stands to 
facilitate compliance with the final constitution’s section 39(2) constitutional 
injunction to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when 
developing the common law and customary law”.290 According to Du Plessis , the 
principle of subsidiarity can be defined as “requiring the court first to try and 
resolve a dispute by applying ordinary legal principles, as interpreted or 
developed with reference to the Bill of Rights, before applying the Bill of rights 
directly to the dispute”.291  
As far as section 36 is concerned, Stu Woolman and Henk Botha calls for a 
thicker conception of limitation analysis but at the same time embrace the 
dialogical possibilities inherent in section 36.292 Woolman and Botha present 
section 36 as the heart of “shared constitutional interpretation”. They explain this 
approach to constitutional meaning as follows: 
From this perspective, powers of judicial review are best understood, not as 
part of a battle for ascendency between courts and legislatures (though they 
may turn into that), or as a means of frustrating the will of the political 
majority, but, rather, as a shared project of constitutional interpretation.293 
 
Section 36 is best read as facilitating this institutional comity between the 
judiciary and legislature in as far as it avoids a court centred constitutional order 
in which the outcome of a legal dispute is dependent entirely on rights definition 
and because it limits the analysis to the threshold of the constitutional as opposed 
to the politically optimal.294 
The debate between the academic champions of weaker forms of review, whether 
grounded in the constitutional design (section 39(2) or section 36) or in judicial 
                                                            
289 Du Plessis L ‘Interpretation’ in Woolman (et al) Constitutional Law of South (2007) 32‐136 32‐
143.   
290 Du Plessis L ‘Interpretation’ in Woolman (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 32‐
136 32‐154.   
291 Du Plessis L ‘Interpretation’ in Woolman S (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 32‐
136 32‐143.   
292 Woolman S and Botha H in Woolman S (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 34‐1. 
293 Woolman S and Botha H in Woolman S (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 34‐1 
34‐105. 
294 Woolman S and Botha H in Woolman S (et al) Constitutional Law of South Africa (2007) 34‐1 
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policy, and the champions of strong and substantive review, has given rise to a 
third view which calls for constitutional pragmatism as the appropriate stance on 
the issue of judicial review in post-apartheid South Africa.   
 
4.4.3	Scholarly	support	for	the	pragmatic	exercise	of	judicial	
review	powers			
 
Mark Kende defends the Constitutional Courts against Ran Hirschl’s complaint 
that the exercise of strong form review has given rise to a new post-apartheid 
“juristocracy”, on the one hand, and complaints by Jackie Dugard that the exercise 
of weak form review has betrayed the pro-poor commitments of the Court, on the 
other.295 In place of an absolute choice between either strong form review or weak 
form review, Kende argues that the Court does best when it pragmatically 
combines the Constitution’s transformative promise with its realistic 
possibilities.296 Kende calls this approach to constitutional review and 
adjudication “African transformative pragmatism” and claims that it combines a 
strong-anti-subordination principle and some caution.297 Kende regards the Fourie 
and Grootboom judgments as good examples of this brand of critical 
pragmatism.298 According to Kende this pragmatism is needed (i) to minimise the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty and to allow the post-apartheid Parliament to 
develop its institutional responsibilities, and (ii) to preserve its institutional 
integrity.299 
Theunis Roux presents an extended defence of judicial pragmatism as guiding 
methodology of new Constitutional Courts in young constitutional democracies, 
such as the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Along similar lines as those 
developed by Kende, Roux argues against strong and principled constitutional 
                                                            
295 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009)286.  
296 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009) 288. 
297 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009) 287. 
298 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009) 271 
and 287. 
299 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009) 272 
and 275. 
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adjudication (such as that championed by Dworkin) as this kind of constitutional 
absolutism or maximalism is bound to endanger the institutional legitimacy and 
security of the Court. Constitutional adjudication is therefore inevitably strategic 
adjudication. Successful courts in young democracies generate legal legitimacy by 
exercising a combination of strong review, when it is institutionally safe to do so, 
and weak review, when it is institutionally risky to stand on a matter of 
constitutional principle. 
It is understandable that the pragmatism defended by Kende and Roux will not 
find broad support from normative constitutional law scholars, let alone judges. 
Kende recalls the view of the Chief Justice of Moldovia on the issue:  
He seemed surprised. He said that such an approach sounded like a strategic 
and political one, not suitable for a court that must simply apply the law and 
let the chips fall where they may.300  
 
The Chief Justice makes a valuable point. A principled approach to the review 
powers of the Constitutional Court, such as that developed by Cockrell, Currie 
and Du Plessis is preferable to the strategic instrumentalism which characterizes 
the pragmatism of Roux and Kende.  The foundational value of the rule of law 
and the institutional independence of the judiciary entrenched in section 165 of 
the Constitution is hard to reconcile with the kind of pragmatism suggested by 
Roux as working philosophy of the Constitutional Court.  
 
 
4.5	Conclusion.		
  
Through examining and discussing the SA position on judicial review it appears 
as if SA has a system that contains both strong-form and weak-form of judicial 
review. This is so, because sections 172 and 38 can result in a strong-form of 
review whereas sections 39(2) and 36 can direct judicial review in a less harsh 
direction. Although the constitution makes provision for both strong and weak 
                                                            
300 Kende M Constitutional Rights in Two Worlds: South Africa and the United States (2009) 275. 
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review, it appears as if the Constitutional Court has exercised a predominantly 
strong-form of review as was seen through the cases discussed in this chapter. 
As stated by O’Regan J that during the first five years the Constitutional Court 29 
legislative provisions were declared to be invalid, and in the following five years 
another 29 legislative provisions were declared invalid, and since then in a period 
of seven years, 32 have been declared invalid. During the seventeen years 57 
challenges to legislative provisions have been upheld.301     
Over the past eighteen years, although, its strong remedies has not always been 
utilised by the Court, and a strong-form of review was not always opted for by the 
Constitutional Court, it strongly appears as if section 172 formed and is still the 
basis for the predominantly strong-form of judicial review in South Africa.     
 
	 	
 
                                                                  
                                                            
301 Kate O’Regan, Judge of the Constitutional Court (1994 – 2009), Helen Suzman Memorial 
Lecture, Johannesburg, November 22 2011.  
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CHAPTER	FIVE.		
5.1.  A	comparative	analysis	of	the	different	positions	in	Canada,	England	
and	South	Africa	respectively.			
	
This chapter will start off with a comparative analysis of judicial review in 
Canada, England and South Africa (SA) insofar as the nature, extent and 
boundaries of judicial interpretation of impugned laws that infringes fundamental 
rights are concerned. Four questions will be asked in respect of the positions in 
Canada, England and SA as already discussed in chapters 2, 3, and 4 above. These 
questions are inter alia: one, what can we learn or adopt from the Canadian 
experience?; two, what can SA learn or adopt from the position under the Human 
Rights Act (HRA)?; three, is it possible to only have weak-form of review in 
South Africa, and if so, how can it possibly be done?; four, are there any risks 
involved in having weak-form of review only, what is there to lose? Finally in this 
chapter, some carefully thought-out suggestions and recommendations will be 
made for possible constitutional reform and the way forward.       
Different from England, the South African superior courts have the power to 
declare unconstitutional and inconsistent any law or conduct which is inconsistent 
with the constitution.302 In Canada, too, the Charter confers upon the courts the 
power to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the 
circumstances,303but in Canada the courts’ judicial remedies and declaratory 
powers are limited to the extent of the application of the notwithstanding 
provisions in legislation.304  
In England, again, courts are limited in their declaratory powers and remedies in 
the sense that it can only make a declaration of Convention-incompatibility, but 
cannot make any order obligating the legislature to respond to its court orders.305    
What makes Canada different from SA is that in SA the superior courts can 
declare any law or conduct unconstitutional to the extent of its inconsistency with 
                                                            
302 ss. 167(5) and172.  
303 Constitution Act 1982 PART I Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.24(1).  
304 Constitution Act 1982 PART I Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms s.33.  
305 Human Rights Act of England ss.3 and 4.  
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the South African constitution306, but in Canada courts can, but not in every 
situation. On face value it appears as if the notwithstanding clause in section 33 is 
conferring a status of parliamentary or legislative sovereignty on legislatures in 
respect of laws that was passed in accordance with section 33 of the Charter of 
Rights in Canada.   
Another feature of Charter rights interpretation is that, even after a declaration of 
unconstitutionality of impugned legislation that infringes fundamental rights, the 
Canadian parliament can still re-enact the same legislation and incorporate a 
notwithstanding clause to exclude Charter rights. The Canadian courts, too, 
cannot order parliament to refrain from incorporating notwithstanding clauses or 
to amend or repeal legislation containing such clauses.  
To distinguish Canada from England, it is clear that they both are Commonwealth 
countries and both exercise a weak-form of judicial review, but in England, courts 
cannot declare a piece of legislation unconstitutional, but may only make a 
declaration of Convention-incompatibility, if a section 3 interpretation cannot 
make the legislation Convention-compatible.307 The situation in Canada is that 
there is a limitation on interpretation and remedies if Charter rights are subject to 
a notwithstanding clause. Under the HRA, courts have interpretative freedom 
during a section 3 interpretation, but parliament is not obligated to amend or 
repeal laws that are not Convention-compatible after a declaration of 
incompatibility. Whereas, it appears as if the Constitutional Court in SA is vested 
with almost unlimited power of judicial review,308and the 1996 constitution has 
elevated the Superior Courts to a status of judicial supremacy.309 
In terms of section 39(2)310 of the SA constitution the courts, when interpreting 
legislation, must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, and 
by doing so the superior courts are using a reading strategy of reading down to 
give effect to section 39(2). Under the HRA, as far as it is possible to do so, 
                                                            
306 ss. 2 and 172.  
307 Human Rights Act of England Act of 1998 ss. 3 and 4.  
308 s.172.  
309 s.167.  
310 s.39(2).  
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legislation must be read and give effect in a way which is Convention-compatible, 
but here the court are not only applying reading down as a strategy, but the courts 
can also read words into legislation to make it Convention-compatible. In both SA 
and England, court must first find an interpretation that is Bill of Rights-compliant 
and Convention-compatible, but if such interpretations are impossible then the SA 
courts can declare legislation to be unconstitutional and section 4 of the HRA 
permits a declaration of incompatibility with the Convention.  
In both South Africa and Canada, section 1 of the Charter and section 36 of the 
South African Bill of Rights permit the limitation of rights subject to justifiability 
and reasonableness, but under the HRA there is no limitation clause.  
One outstanding  feature of England that set it totally apart from both SA and 
Canada is that it do not have a Bill of Rights, although attempts to adopt a Bill of 
Rights is currently in process.311It was reported that in March 2011, a Commission 
was established to investigate the creation of a Bill of Rights that incorporates and 
builds on all the obligations under the ECHR, and to ensure that these rights 
continue to be enshrined in British law. Whereas in South Africa we have a Bill of 
Rights for at least 18 years, and in Canada, too, the Charter of Rights exists for the 
past 30 years.  
The advantage of a section 172 interpretation and powers is that, it not only 
allows the constitutional court to declare legislation unconstitutional, but it can 
order parliament to react positively towards its declarations. In terms of section 4 
of the HRA however, a declaration is possible, but parliament cannot be ordered 
by the courts to amend or repeal Convention-incompatible laws. In Canada, too, 
although the court can use an appropriate remedy under the circumstances, its 
hands are tied as far as section 33 is concerned.   
 
                                                            
311 Ministry of Justice ‘Responding to human rights judgments’ Report to the Joint Committee on 
Human Rights on the Government response to human rights judgments 2011‐12 p 6 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/policy/moj/responding‐human‐rights‐
judgments.pdf  (accessed on 08 November 2012).   
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As far as the appropriate relief is section 24 of the Charter is concerned, it only 
applies to the rights and freedoms in the Charter of Rights (bearing in mind any 
notwithstanding clauses) and not to the whole Canadian Constitution, but the 
remedies in terms of sections 172 and 38 of the SA constitution, applies to all the 
rights, freedoms and privileges in the SA constitution. 
 
5.2.	 What	can	SA	learn	or	adopt	from	the	Canadian	experience?   	
 
The discussions in chapter two is indicating that section 33, although still part of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights, has not been used by the Canadian parliament for 
at least 13 years. This appears to be evident that the notwithstanding clause has 
become unimportant. According to Hogg and Bushell, in practice section 33 has 
become relatively unimportant because of the development of a political climate 
of resistance to its use. Only in Quebec, Hogg and Bushell hold, does the use of 
section 33 seem to be politically acceptable and even in Quebec there is only one 
example of the use of section 33 to overcome the effect of a judicial decision.312 
If SA would have to incorporate a constitutional mechanism similar to section 33 
of the Charter, it will means that we will have partial parliamentary sovereignty as 
far as legislation containing a notwithstanding clause is concerned and 
considering the Canadian experience, such a mechanism would not contribute to 
an institutional dialogue in SA. Canada is a country with a longstanding history of 
judicial review of over 200 years and SA is only exercising judicial review of 
legislation for the past 18 years. We cannot compare ourselves entirely with 
Canada.  
 
 
 
                                                            
312Hogg P.W and Bushell A ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’  (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75 83.   
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5.3.	What	can	SA	learn	or	adopt	from	the	position	under	the	HRA?		
 
In our SA constitution we already have section 39(2) which is drafted in a similar 
fashion as section 3 of the HRA, although SA courts are only using the remedy of 
reading down and not also reading-in when doing a section 39(2) interpretation.  
As far as section 4 of the HRA is concerned, it limits the courts to a declaration of 
Convention-incompatibility and courts cannot declare legislation unconstitutional 
or order parliament to act positively towards Convention-incompatible 
declarations. Further, the HRA created no duties or obligations upon parliament to 
amend or repeal laws that have been declared Convention-incompatible.  
Considering parliament’s response to declarations of incompatibility, it appears as 
if the British parliament tacitly accepts responsibility to amend or repeal 
Convention-incompatible legislation, but that alone is no guarantee that 
parliament will in future continue to ‘de facto’ accept that responsibility. It would 
have placed the courts in a better position if courts could have been able 
(constitutionally mandated) to order parliament to respond to its declarations, and 
at the same time parliament would have been ‘de jure’ responsible to repeal or 
amend legislation that is not Convention-compatible.   
More important is that, the HRA only came into force in the year 2000, and 
therefore twelve years is not enough in order to determine whether sections 3 and 
4 is the best possible mechanism to ensure and maintain effective relationships 
between British legislatures and courts, and to avoid tension between them.  
 
5.4. Is	 it	possible	to	only	have	weak‐form	of	review	 in	SA,	and	 if	so,	how	
can	it	possibly	be	done?		
	
In searching for this possibility it is important to have regard to our SA law-
making process, which prescribed compulsory requirements for the enactment and 
amendment of legislation. An attempt to answer the question of whether it is 
possible to achieve weak-form of review through an institutional dialogue in SA, 
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and if possible, what needs to be done, has to be a two-stage approach, this 
dissertation suggests.     
The first stage in an attempt to only have weak-form review or amend section 172 
or section 167 of the constitution to reduce the Constitutional Court’s powers to 
have a weaker form of review only, involves formal constitutional amendments, 
regulated in terms of section 74 of the constitution. The second stage, which I 
consider the difficult stage, is the practical stage.   
As far as SA is concerned, a number of factors need to be considered before 
attempting to propose any constitutional changes (constitutional mechanism(s)) 
that would realise this possibility of weak-form review only.   
5.4.1.	The	first	stage.		
 
In discussing the first (formal) stage of this possibility, I want to raise two 
concerns. First, having regard to the current political situation, in particular the 
African National Congress’s (ANC) dominant political party status in SA.  
Obtaining the required majority parliamentary votes313 to amend the constitution 
would be relatively easy for the ANC to achieve.  
It was reported that President Jacob Zuma wants the constitutional court’s powers 
to be reviewed, and in February 2012 he declared that “we don’t want to review 
                                                            
313 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 s.74(1)‐(3). Section 74(1)‐(3) 
provides as follows: Section 1 and this subsection may be amended by a Bill passed by – 
(a) the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least 75 per cent of its members; 
and 
(b) the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces.  
 
(2)   Chapter 2 may be amended by a Bill passed by –  
(a)   the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members; and 
(b)   the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six provinces. 
 
(3)   Any other provision of the Constitution may be amended by a Bill passed –  
(a)   by the National Assembly, with a supporting vote of at least two thirds of its members;     
        and 
(c) also by the National Council of Provinces, with a supporting vote of at least six 
provinces, if the amendment –  
(i) relates to a matter that affects the Council; 
(ii) alters provincial boundaries, powers, functions or institutions; or 
(iii) amends a provision that deals specifically with a provincial matter.  
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the constitutional court, we want to review its powers”.314I ascribed this 
possibility exclusively to the ANC’s current political status, by holding the 
majority votes and control over eight of the nine provinces of SA.315   
Choudhry, for example, is of the view that SA is emerging as a “leading example 
of a dominant-party democracy, with the ANC having won every national election 
since 1993, now in power in eight of nine provinces, and with no sign of a 
credible electoral competitor on the horizon”.316 Factors that explain the ANC’s 
dominant-party status in South Africa, according to Choudhry, are, inter alia, the 
lack of an opposition party that could credibly contend for power. Choudhry hold 
that, the apparent unwillingness of black voters to support the opposition parties 
had led to explain those parties’ lack of success in racial terms.317  
According to Choudhry, in discharging its constitutional function as the ultimate 
interpreter of the constitution, the court should draw upon a set of background 
assumptions about the nature of the South African politics, derive its 
constitutional role from that broader understanding, and craft constitutional 
doctrine to give effect to that role.318 Choudhry argues that anti-domination is a 
doctrine that would render illegitimate any exercise of public power that has as its 
principal goal the preservation, enhancement or entrenchment of the dominant 
status of a dominant political party.319  
De Vos, in response to the Democratic Alliance’s (DA) national leader and 
Premier of the Western Cape, Helen Zille’s suggestion of a united opposition or 
‘super opposition’, is of the view that “it seems like a misdiagnosis of the 
fundamental pathology underlying our political system”. De Vos is of the opinion 
                                                            
314 http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2012/02/13/zuma‐wants‐constituional‐court‐powers‐to‐
be‐reviewed   (accessed on 15 February 2012).    
3152009 Elections Report pp.100 – 105 available at 
http://www.elections.org.za/content/Dynamic.aspx?id=1316&name=Elections&LeftMenuld=100
&BreadCrumbld=220  (accessed on 02 August 2012).  
316 Choudhry S  ‘ “He had a mandate” The South African Constitutional Court and the African 
National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 2  3.  
317 Choudhry S  ‘ “He had a mandate” The South African Constitutional Court and the African 
National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 2  13.  
318 Choudhry S ‘ “He had a mandate” The South African Constitutional Court and the African 
National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 2  33.  
319 Choudhry S ‘ “He had a mandate” The South African Constitutional Court and the African 
National Congress in a Dominant Party Democracy’ (2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 2  34.  
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that, “given the distinct nature of our electoral system and composition of political 
parties, in the long run a united opposition might do more harm than good, and 
that many ANC voters will never vote for a party led by a white person and many 
DA voters, too, will never vote for a political party led by a black person”.  
De Vos further holds that, “the more successful the DA (or an amalgamation of 
the DA and other opposition parties) becomes and the more opportunities it 
provides to its members to gain access to political power and financial rewards, 
the more often some of its leaders will be caught in tender scandals and the more 
one will read about how corrupt the party has become”. De Vos sees politicians in 
opposition as “great defenders of a justiciable constitution because it limits the 
power of their opposition in government and can help to check the abuse of power 
by the government and can force it to be more open, transparent and accountable. 
Once in power, former opposition parties have a tendency to be less enthusiastic 
about the constitution which they suddenly discover places pesky limits on their 
ability to do as they please”.320   
Secondly, the SA history, a history of inequalities, and apartheid, and I therefore 
think that only a strong-form of review can redress this inequalities and can heal 
the wounds of apartheid. Apartheid was also a product of parliamentary 
sovereignty and therefore, in order to avoid a repetition of this shameful 
experience, democracy, including multi-party representation and input is strongly 
recommended in the South African context.    
 
5.4.2.	The	second	stage.		
 
The second stage in an attempt to only have weak-form review (the practical 
stage), begs the questions of, how will SA be able to avoid another situation 
where (although it only happened once in SA) an order of constitutional invalidity 
                                                            
320 De Vos, P ‘Unified opposition maybe not such a bright idea’ available at  
www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za (accessed on 25 October 2012).  
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by the constitutional court has been disrespected, similar to Satchwell?321How 
will we be able to stop a dominant-political party let parliament from passing 
Bills, despite major disagreements between political parties, protestations and the 
unhappiness of the general public at large in respect of the essentials a Bill? A 
good example is the Protection of State Bill.322 The Bill proposed to criminalise 
the unlawful and intentional communication, delivery or the making available of 
state information classified as top secret and that conviction on such offence 
would carry a punishment of at least 15 to a maximum of 25 years 
imprisonment.323 In asking these questions and making this suggestion, I am alive 
to the section 74 requirements for constitutional amendments, but I am making 
this suggestion in the light of the nature and importance of the constitution of 
South Africa.  
    
More important questions that the second stage is asking, is, if institutional 
dialogue happens (through weak-form review only), where or when will this 
dialogue end, and who will have the final say in constitutional interpretation in 
SA, parliament or the constitutional court? Currently, the Constitutional Court has 
the final voice324 in all constitutional matters in SA, and to repeal or abolish 
sections 172 or 167 will mean that, if there is disagreement between the Courts 
and parliament, then parliament will have the last say, and eventually, it will take 
us back to parliamentary sovereignty to a certain extent. 
 Moseneke J is of the view that “the function of the Constitutional Court is 
counter-majoritarian at times, but is ultimately supportive of democracy, and it 
upholds protection that ensures democratic process and protects both minority and 
majority rights under the beneficence of our constitutional arrangements”.325 
Constitutional supremacy as a principle is too high a price to pay in exchange for 
a weak-form of review only.      
                                                            
321 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (6) SA 1 (CC).  
322 Protection of State Information Bill [B6‐2010].  
323 Protection of State Information Bill [B6‐2010] clause 36(1).  
324 s.167(3)(a) and (c).   
325 Moseneke D Deputy Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa ‘Striking a Balance Between 
the Will of the People and the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2012) 129 (Part 1) SALJ  9 22.  
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5.5.		Are	there	any	risks	involved	in	having	only	weak‐form	of	review	in	SA	
‐	what	is	there	to	lose?       
  
As mentioned above, currently, this possibility of amending the constitution as to 
only have weak-form of review is currently only open to the ANC, being the 
ruling political party in SA (on the assumption that the ANC wants to change or 
reduce the Constitutional Court’s powers). In the context of the ANC’s dominant-
party status, this possible amendments to the constitution, if done by the ANC, 
can and will raise many concerns, not only amongst politicians, legal scholars, 
academics, the judicial community, but also the SA society at large.  
Many questions can be asked in this regard, for example, will the views and 
opinions of the minority political parties, academics, scholars of law and the 
general SA society be considered in the process of the possible amendments to the 
constitution? The current debates and protestation around the Protection of State 
Information Bill326(the so-called ‘Secrecy Bill’) begs the question of whether not 
such possible constitutional amendment, if it happen, should rather be done 
through multi-political party considered proposals for the constitutional 
amendments.  
As Chaskalson J puts it, and I am in agreement with him, “The constitution, 
however, is not ordinary legislation to be amended at the whim of the majority. It 
is the foundation of the nation’s values and aspirations. As such, and to ensure the 
allegiance of all citizens, good constitutions seek to accommodate the diverse 
interests and concerns of different groups. In the interest of nation building we are 
bound by all its provisions, and cannot pick and choose those that we honour and 
those that we don’t”.327In this regard, I think that the views of the greater South 
African society should be considered before any attempt in amending the 
                                                            
326 Protection of State Information Bill [B6‐2010].  
327 Chaskalson A  ‘Is South Africa’s Constitution in Danger?’ Address presented at a  public 
dialogue : Hosted by the Centre for Conflict Resolution, Cape Town on Thursday 10th MaY 2012 
available at http://www.ifaisa.org/Is_South_Africa’s_Constitution_in_Danger? (accessed on 30 
May 2012).   
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constitution, to abolish sections 172 and 167 or to incorporate a constitutional 
mechanism that is drafted in the similar fashion as in the case section 33 of the 
Charter of Rights of the Canadian constitution or the Human Rights Act’s sections 
4.  
Another concern is threats to the institutional security and independence of the 
judiciary, including the separation of powers. In this regard I want to make 
mention of recent statements made by President Jacob Zuma and others.  
President Jacob Zuma recently declared that: 
“The executive must be allowed to conduct its administration and policymaking 
work as freely as it possibly can. The powers conferred to the courts cannot be 
regarded as superior to the powers resulting from a mandate given by the people 
in a popular vote”.328  
It is statements such as these one’s made by President Jacob Zuma that is 
evidence of tension between, the executive and parliament with its democratic 
mandate from the people on the one hand and the constitutional court which is 
constitutionally mandated on the other hand. The constitutional court has recently 
handed down judgments that are not always favourable to parliament329 or the 
executive.330 As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, in a system of 
constitutional supremacy or parliamentary sovereignty, it is obvious that only one 
mandatory has a final say, it is either parliament or the constitutional court, but it 
can never be both.  
Earlier in this year, Mr Jackson Mthembu, ANC National Spokesperson stated 
that, the continued attempt by the DA to use the courts to undermine and paralyse 
government, is granting blanket permission to political parties to ask for the 
review any state decision, using courts and that democracy can be undermined by 
                                                            
328 The Editorial ‘Courting disaster with the judiciary’ available at http://mg.co.za/article/2011‐11‐
04‐courting‐disaster‐with‐the‐judiciary  (accessed on 09 February 2012).      
329 Democratic Alliance v The Acting National Director of Public Prosecutions (288/11) [2012] 
ZASCA.  
330 Justice Alliance of South Africa v President of the Republic of South Africa and Other Case CCT 
53/11 [2011] ZACC 23.  
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simply approaching courts to reverse any decision arrived at by a qualified organ 
of state.331  
Deputy Chief Justice of the Constitutional Court, Moseneke J, is of the opinion 
that, “if there is a danger in parliamentary sovereignty, there is also a danger in 
constitutional supremacy”. According to Moseneke J, “contemporary attacks on 
the Constitutional Court as undermining the popular will have traction precisely 
because they are rooted in a legitimate fear”. In response to a recent statement by 
ANC secretary-general Gwede Mantashe, that the Constitutional Court was 
thwarting the will of the people by finding legislation passed by parliament to be 
unconstitutional, Moseneke J, acknowledge that “tension clearly exists between 
democratic theory and constitutional supremacy, but this is not a dilemma peculiar 
to our shores, and it is perhaps endemic to all constitutional democracies. 
Moseneke J is of the view that it is not open to the courts to look away when 
confronted with unconstitutionality, but they are enjoyed to declare the problem 
and to fashion redress.332  
In response to President Jacob Zuma’s statement in parliament, Rautenbach is of 
the view that, within the SA context, there is major jurisprudential obstacle that 
obstructs the introduction of a cavalier approach by parliament. In order to change 
this situation either the constitutional court will have to override its many 
judgments in which it has pronounced this legality doctrine, or parliament by 
following the prescribed procedure for the amendment of the constitution will 
have to delete the rule of law as a fundamental principle from section 1 of the 
constitution or proclaim categorically that the rule of law does not contain a 
rational-relationship rule. Because the constitutional court has the last say on 
whether such an amendment is rationally related to a legitimate government 
purpose, the government will have to convince the court that a legitimate 
                                                            
331 Staff Reporter ‘ANC:SCA ruling undermines democracy’ available at 
http://www.mg.co.za/article/2012‐03‐20‐sca‐ruling‐undermines‐democracy‐says‐anc  (accessed 
on 24 March 2012).  
332 Moseneke D Deputy Chief Justice of the Republic of South Africa ‘Striking a Balance Between 
the Will of the People and the Supremacy of the Constitution’ (2012) Vol. 129 (Part 1) SALJ  9 17.  
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governmental purpose exists to dispose of what the constitutional court considers 
to be an essential feature of the rule of law.333 
The supremacy clause in section 2 of the constitution, Rautenbach holds, does not 
permit the exclusion from any action from judicial review, and that political 
questions cannot be separated from legal questions.334 It would be unwise for 
anybody to develop policies only in terms of politics and not to heed the 
constitutionality of the actions to implement the policy. Although the 
constitutional court is the authoritative interpreter of the constitution, a cavalier 
approach by individuals and other branches of government to see what they can 
get away with without paying too much attention to the ‘debatable ground of 
constitutional study’ is inappropriate. According to Rautenbach, the doctrine 
according to which ‘political questions’ are immunised from judicial review 
cannot work, because legal rules and their content are often determined by the 
dynamics of politics, in any sense of the word and in all spheres of government. 
However, this inevitable state of affairs cannot mean that a constitutional project 
of which constitutional supremacy and judicial control are essential elements can 
be qualified in order to let politics run an unrestrained course. The constitution 
affords parliament and the executive ample freedom, margins of appreciation and 
discretion to decide on the contents of policies and their implementation, but this 
freedom is constitutionally limited and its exercise is subject to judicial control.335   
Frank Michelman agrees with Rautenbach that constitutional supremacy is a 
constitutional value incorporated into section 1 of the 1996 constitution, and that 
whenever and insofar as a legal norm or rule of decision laid down by the final 
constitution comes into practical collision with a legal norm or rule of decision 
laid down by any sort of non-constitutional law (as construed), be it parliamentary 
legislation, subordinate legislation, common law, or customary law, the final 
                                                            
333 Rautenbach IM ‘Policy and judicial review – political questions, margins of appreciation and 
the South African constitution’ (2012) 1 TSAR 20‐34  26.  
334 Rautenbach IM ‘Policy and judicial review – political questions, margins of appreciation and 
the South African constitution’ (2012) 1 TSAR 20‐34  28.  
335 Rautenbach IM ‘Policy and judicial review – political questions, margins of appreciation and 
the South African constitution’ (2012) 1 TSAR 20‐34  33.   
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constitution’s norm is to be given precedence by anyone whose project is to carry 
out the law of South Africa.336  
 
5.6.	Conclusion.			
 
By considering the factors discussed above, I do not think that SA is yet ready for 
major constitutional changes that will have the effect of reducing the 
Constitutional Court’s review powers under either one of sections 172 or 167 of 
the constitution. Several factors definitely have to be taken into consideration 
before any attempt should be made in realising the possibility for weak-form 
review only.  
There are major inescapable factors that have to be considered before proposing 
any current or future amendment to the SA strong-form review embedded in 
sections 172 and 167. These factors should enjoy due consideration by the current 
dominant-party let parliament before attempting to make amendments to the 
essential elements of SA predominantly strong-form review.  
SA has a very young democracy and we are only exercising judicial review of 
legislation for the past 18 years. Therefore we cannot compare SA to certain 
Commonwealth countries where predominantly weak-form review is exercised, 
for example England and Canada.  
The SA history is another reason why a weak-form review only might not be the 
best thinkable solution to resolve ongoing tensions between the judiciary and the 
other branches of the South African government. In 1994, SA has departed from a 
system of parliamentary sovereignty and has entered into an era of constitutional 
supremacy.  
The ANC’s dominant-party status is yet another reason for me holding that a 
weak-form of review will not be the best form of judicial review for SA. I am 
                                                            
336 Woolman S and Botha H in Woolman S, Roux T and Bishop M ‘Constitutional Law of South 
Africa’  Student Edition (2007) 11‐34 to 11‐36.  
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fully in support of the first two assumptions made by Waldron in his case against 
judicial review. Waldron assumes inter alia, that, (1), the society has a broadly 
democratic political system with universal adult suffrage, and it has a 
representative legislature, to which elections are held on a fair and regular basis, 
and that these democratic institutions are in reasonably good order. They may not 
be perfect and there are probably on-going debates as to how they might be 
improved;337(2), the society we are considering has courts that are well-
established and politically independent judiciary, again in reasonably working 
order.338 Considering the current political situation in SA, I think that SA complies with 
Waldron’s second assumption, because we do have a politically independent judiciary 
that is in a reasonably working order. SA also have democratic institutions that are in 
reasonably good order, except for the ANC’s dominant-Party status our legislature is 
mainly representing only one dominant political party. Therefore I think that our mixture 
of strong and weak-form review should be retained, and therefore no attempts should be 
made to amend sections 172 or 167 of the constitution.  
Finally, an institutional dialogue cannot be a bad thing339 to the constitutional and 
statutory interpretation of any state, but my view is that in the SA context, we can 
strive towards this dialogue, but only if we can keep our strong-form together with 
the alternative weaker forms of review offered in the constitution. If institutional 
dialogue is realised and maintain with retaining SA strong-form of review, it 
cannot pose any threat to the independence of the judiciary and the supremacy340 
of the constitution of SA.      
 
 
 
 
                                                            
337 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346 1361.  
338 Waldron J ‘The Core Case Against Judicial Review’ (2005‐2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346 1363.   
339Hogg P.W and Bushell A  ‘The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures (Or Perhaps 
the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such A Bad Thing After All)’ (1997) 35 No.1 Osgoode Hall L J 75  82.  
340 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s.2.  
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